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 Post-socialist urban political movements are occurring throughout the world in various 
states.  These movements emerge from changes in political democracy and development.  When 
a previously established socialist system is replaced by one that is democratic, transitions follow.  
When the democratic system is still new, the state’s leadership has trouble defining the new 
principles from which their political system will operate.  During the transition the political 
leadership’s activities can stray away from those based in democratic practices.  The result is 
tension felt between the rule enforcers (the political elite) and the citizens who expect execution 
of promised changes.  Throughout the transition, the people see what has changed, the remaining 
modifications, the developments still expected and what is stagnant.  The people react through 
protest.  This is part of the growing process of a new democratic state. 
 Such is the case for Ukraine and its Orange Revolution, which responded to the rigged 
presidential election of 2004.  This thesis reviews the Orange Revolution and its role in post-
socialist urban political movements.  It is presented through first-hand recollections of citizens 
who witnessed and participated in the movement.  These people express their observations of the 
changes seen, expected and still pending. 
 The Orange Revolution was a social movement – based on political action.  Preceding the 
aforementioned event are similar movements in other states seeking change in political 
leadership and enacting democratic values.  Many urban social movements occurred in states 
where socialism was once the approach to all politics and way of life.  They include 
Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution in 1989; Serbia’s “October 5th Overthrow” in September 
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2000 and Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003.  These movements responded to fraudulent 
elections.  Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution followed the Orange Revolution in 2005, as did 
movements in Lebanon and Kuwait.  Protests became the means to force transition to a 
functioning democratic state.  Therefore, post-socialist urban political movements are important 
to review as states reform their governmental structures. 
 Defining post-socialist urban political movements is necessary to clearly see how that 
transition is the main reason to spur the movement.  These movements occurred in states where 
Soviet-style socialism was politically dominant for two or more generations.  The most profound 
change from the pre-socialist society was the weakening of meritocratic principles of gaining and 
sustaining employment in favor of a patronage system, especially the patronage of the dominant 
political party.  Often described as corrupt, the Party rewarded loyalty and punished dissent and 
opposition. Such systems depend on the loyalty and connivance of a large portion of the 
population to remain in control.  Any evidence that “history” may be moving away from the 
Party in power undermines that authority.  Protests, if they can bring enough people into the 
streets, are strong evidence of a shift in power. 
 Ukraine’s 2004 election marked the end of President Leonid Kuchma’s tenure.  During 
his presidency, Kuchma and the oligarchs grew into a strong group whose actions were corrupt.  
These activities rooted in corruption, resulted in slowing the growing democratic system’s 
development.  To preserve their survival, Kuchma and the oligarchs rigged the 2004 presidential 
election to get their favorable results (Åslund, Anders and Michael McFaul., eds., 2006, 1).  
They wanted to elect Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s preferred candidate and fellow oligarch.  
Assurance was desired that Yanukovych would lead the government instead of Viktor 
Yushchenko, the candidate that appeared to be greatly supported and preferred by the people.  
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 Yushchenko, in opposition to Yanukovych, saw that changes were necessary to reinstate 
democracy and growth within Ukraine.  Thus, Yushchenko’s candidacy was supported by 
impatient and disenchanted citizens.  This support made his position as a candidate more 
concrete.  It was further complimented by support from Yulia Tymoshenko, who agreed with 
Yushchenko and wanted changes within Ukraine. 
 The Orange Revolution held the foundation for a social movement: frustration with the 
lagging democratic development which created discourse within the state, mobilization of the 
people through a charismatic leader and the desire for change to promote the greater good.  
However to succeed, the movement needed to bring people into the street.  The events that 
occurred five years before the Orange Revolution show their service as the catalyst to erupt 
change.  The acts of corruption, fraud and stagnation of growth challenged the desired 
improvements for the state. 
 Shortly after the events of the Orange Revolution in 2004, scholar Taras Kuzio 
acknowledged that the event and the mass protests’ strength emerged from three separate sectors 
of Ukrainian society: civil society and opposition groups who organized the revolution, the 
narod (people) who provided the power behind the crowds and the defectors from the party in 
power, who turned their backs on Kuchma (Kuzio, 2005, 29).  The people’s frustration of their 
current observations and what they desire as an end result for the state solidified in the 
immediate political goals of increasing civil participation, and governmental transparency. 
 This motivated to result in the particular presented case study.  Kuzio’s theory on how the 
Orange Revolution emerged within the Ukrainian public is reviewed.  The key contributing 
groups of society in Ukraine are broken down in further discussion.  They theory presented by 
Kuzio also is assessed as to how it relates to social movement theory.  An analysis on how 
4 
 
Kuzio’s theory deviates from the pre-defined understanding of urban social movements is 
presented in this thesis.  Kuzio’s theory is also contextualized through the examples provided by 
testimonies gathered by the narod as new information surrounding post-socialist urban political 
movements. 
 Though smaller events and activities occurred in the years before Ukraine’s 2004 
presidential elections; I argue that the Orange Revolution was an independent event.  I also argue 
that it resulted from a political election and Yushchenko’s call to action for the people to stand 
up to the current political regime.  With this, I ask: What was it about the movement or timing of 
the Orange Revolution’s emergence that allowed the protest to occur?  Why was the Orange 
Revolution more than just the vote it surrounded, and was it more than just a social movement?  
What changed within Ukraine (if anything) that led the Orange Revolution, thereby encouraging 
the public to participate and take to the streets in protest?  Finally, what are the implications of 
the Orange Revolution in the overall big picture of Ukraine’s political development? 
 To answer my questions, I rely on primary sources and historical information on this 
topic that has already been published.  Additionally, I will bring new data to the work of 
contemporary historians.  The data I present regarding this event consists of oral histories of 
individuals who lived in Ukraine before and during the Orange Revolution.  Relating their 
experiences shows the strong social basis for the appeal of the movement that led to the street 
protests.  This is despite considerable variation in the positions of the individuals. 
 My research participants needed to meet a set of qualifications: they were at least 14 
years old in 1991 and recall life under socialism.  I also requested that the candidates all lived in 
Ukraine, preferably in Kyiv, the capital, during the Orange Revolution, even if they subsequently 
emigrated.  At the time of their interviews, participants were located in the United States – 
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Boston, Minneapolis, and Chicago – and throughout Ukraine.  Interviews were conducted in 
person, through internet telephony (Skype) and email exchanges. 
 I want to disprove that the Orange Revolution was merely an event where the public and 
citizens released a burst of pent up frustrations.  I want to prove that the protest and event as a 
whole occurred independently from the election and previous events.  My prediction is: we will 
find that the Orange Revolution occurred resulting from numerous gradual changes that were too 
slow for the public to see an end result after they were started.  My research findings will be 
presented as follows: 
1. Background 
I. Urban social movements 
a. Theoretical approaches 
b. Indicate how this information is applicable to Ukraine. 
II. Ukraine 
a. Understanding Ukraine before the Orange Revolution 
i. Information on discourse from within to be included. 
b. Dynamics of Post-Soviet corruption. 
III. The Orange Revolution 
a. Basic history of the event 
b. Description of political parties, their key figures and the candidates’ platforms 
c. Description of Pora and the group’s role leading up to and during the Orange 
Revolution. 
i. Additional discussion on assistance Pora received from smaller groups 
trained in non-violent protest methods. 
2.   Oral History from the Orange Revolution 
 Participant selection qualifiers, questions posed to participants and methodology of how 
the histories were collected and recorded 
 Selected narratives showing both common experiences and variations. 
 Review of narratives and their correlation to urban social movements. 
3.  Hypotheses review and assessment 
 Review of Kuzio’s hypothesis 
 Assess Kuzio’s hypothesis of how the Orange Revolution emerged within the public.  
 Determine how and if his argument is supported or disproved by social movement theory 
 Determine if my research coincides and agrees with his agreement. 
4.  Conclusion 
 Review overall new findings on urban social movements 
 Review new findings on Post-Soviet state corruption 
 Assessment of how my research findings can be applied to provide insight to social 





URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 Urban social movements are not a limited phenomena.  Many urban social movements 
occurred in states where socialism was once the political system and way of life.  As a 
democratic system emerged within these states, a new thought process followed.  This is a result 
of socialism being the norm for two or more generations.  Competing ideas are visible between 
demographical divisions who see different ways of life.  Many of these movements emerged 
because of political activities involving the concept of one person, one vote, and the lack of civic 
participation and transparency.  Frustration regarding growing discourse results in protest, 
demanding change to encourage a democratic system. 
 Ultimately, the relationship of such an occurrence and the cause and effect associated is a 
result of two things.  First, the relationship is not random.  Second, it’s evolving and supposed to 
happen.  Eventually, the end result comes about.  It is the combination of a series of smaller 
factors which come into play.  The tipping point is another factor which spurs the movement to 
evolve.  That then, becomes the overall, final result.  Furthermore, two primary groups are 
involved:  figures of authority – political power holders, and the general population.  The 
population sees the power holders’ actions.  These actions are questioned by the population 
holding certain expectations of what should occur versus what is occurring.  It is the way to try 
to further establish and promote the transition towards democracy. 
 Reviewing the concept of post-socialist urban political movements is necessary to clearly 
see how that transition is the reason to spur the movement.  It is important to review particular 
movements within specific cases in order to predict what will likely happen next.  The terms of 
the democratic system are determined by the state itself as no two democracies are identical. 
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 How do you define a social movement?  Roberta Garner observes that a social movement 
“is constituted by human beings engaged in discourses and practices designed to challenge and 
change society as they define it.  It is formed by people, who over the course of time, are 
involved in non-institutionalized discourses and practices of change” (Garner, 1996, 12).  The 
population sees change is necessary.  They desire it to occur and will aid it by means of a social 
movement.  Collectively, the public can communicate and acknowledge the present discourse 
and initiate resolution by modifying internal happenings of the power holders.  Civil 
participation and transparency must be present to express the frustration of what is observed and 
for the desired end result.  Urban social movements serve as the motivation for the most wanted 
change from within, expressed by both urban and rural populations. 
 Traditionally, the urban population is driven to participate in such movements.  Their 
ideology of the event is based in the movement’s opportunity.  The urban population in such 
situations thrives on this ideology.  They seek the opportunity for the movement, the chance to 
improve the quality of their life and the possible available options.  They are focused on the end 
result, regardless of the tension that emerges under such circumstances.  The urban population 
relies on the rural population to assist with the ideal and contribute to the masses along with their 
own desires and motivations.  Urban populations want to improve their quality of life and the 
potential opportunities available to them.   The urban population is more focused on the overall 
end result – improvement from the current system.  The driving force is the desire to see that 
result become a reality. 
 Rural populations are motivated to participate in the movement and activities within the 
state.  Additionally, they are more willing to lay their life on the line, sacrificing themselves 
while fighting for the cause.  They feel their desires and participation helps motivate the wanted 
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change.  The rural population helps the ideal and contributes to the masses by adding numbers.  
The rural population’s passion for the desired change unites them with the urban population.  
The urban population is aided by the rural population’s passion and energy.  Together, they stand 
up for the modifications they commonly want to see and develop, making the change systemic. 
 In the 20
th
 century, rural movements primarily resulted from taxation, being pushed to the 
economic margins of sustainability.  Urban movements, conversely, are massive non-violent 
demonstrations.  Though tensions may run very high during an urban movement, the desire and 
act to destroy everything does not occur.  Such an act would deflect from the movement’s focus.  
Likewise, pro-democracy movements attempt to “limit violent and coercive action against any 
human being” (Garner, 1996, 149).  The ultimate goal of the movement, and initiating change 
from within, is to express the desire for change in a non-violent fashion.  Maintaining non-
violent mindsets and actions aids to ensure stability and calm amidst tension.  If violent acts 
emerge, the potential for internal civil war increases. 
 Certain factors are necessary for urban social movements to emerge.  These factors are: 
discourse within the state, mobilizing the people through a charismatic leader and the desire to 
promote the greater good to result in a new outcome.  The event’s desired outcome is to remodel 
the current conditions and environment in the state.  Urban social movements challenge the 
state’s current activities and system.  They try to impose change.  There is no guarantee that the 
desired outcome will be the end result. 
 Due to the unstable nature of an outcome, social movements are “natural experiments in 
power, legitimating and democracy” (Crossley, 2002, 9).  The intent and desire for change is 
present.  Though, means for executing change must be introduced and performed in a way to 
encourage the desired end result.  This end result is contingent on the situation and circumstances 
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surrounding the movement’s initiation.  Charles Tilly’s three main elements of contingency for 
social movements are: 
 1). Campaigns of collective claims on target authorities. 
2). An array of claim-making performances which include special-purpose associations, 
public meetings, medial statements and demonstrations. 
3). Public representations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment of the cause 
(Tilly, 2004, 7). 
 
 Social movements need mobilization tactics to engage the public in the overall cause and 
encourage their persistent activity.  The end result in promoting involvement is ownership and 
the value experienced by the citizens after participating in such events.  This defines Charles 
Tilly’s bottom-up nationalism process.  The mobilization leaders reach out to the population 
lacking their own representation and establish historical distinctions, coherence, connectedness 
and the followers’ determination to claim their right to political autonomy (Tilly, 2002, 68).  
Uniting the population and finding commonality for their desires, establishes the foundation for a 
social movement.  Additionally, a sense of ownership for participation is instilled; thus 
furthering personal investment in the event.  Together, they can address what they feel may be 
wrong within society and express the changes desired for improvement. 
 Social movements campaign to change existing norms within a state.  They express the 
collective desire to right wrongs committed and felt by a very specific population (Tilly, 2002, 
88).  For many of the post-socialist political movements, a stagnated transition to a democratic 
system was the primary reason to promote the movement’s emergence.  The inception of the new 
system, once socialism was removed as the primary practice, was not developing as expected. 
 During an urban social movement, diverse feelings and emotions can be present and 
emerge from those involved.  Fear among citizens can exist.  This fear results from uncertainty 
that their efforts demanding change may be done in vain, and the desired end result may not 
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follow.  Such an outcome is possible after the protest.  Giugni states, “when protest actions are 
combined with shifts in public opinion favorable to the movements, the actors’ chances to obtain 
a substantial impact on policy should increase and thereby point to a joint effect of protest and 
public opinion” (Giugni, 2004, 6-7).  In this case study, the public’s opinion did not shift.  
Instead, the opportunity to express their pre-existing opinions, without facing serious retribution 
for their actions was present. 
 
HOW URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS RELATE TO UKRAINE 
 Ukrainian citizens had the opportunity to express dissatisfaction with the outgoing 
presidential regime.  The cumulative and indirect effects mediated by the overall environment 
socially and politically, were greater and prominent.  Combining the desire to end corruption and 
manipulation in response to an event holding the potential to either continue the status quo or 
change it, resulted in the Orange Revolution.  These are factors that made the Orange Revolution 
a civil revolution and involved all groups of society.  Many of the social movements that 
emerged within recent years had a socialistic approach to politics.  During the transition to 
democracy, an urban social movement materializes.  It is a way to help establish the initiated 
transitions and advance it toward democracy. 
 For someone living in Ukraine today, compared to their life during Soviet Ukraine, they 
will observe that life has changed quite immensely.  These changes are found in their living 
opportunities.  These opportunities are observed in how and where they live, education and the 
structure of their everyday lifestyle for employment.  All of these things are now different from 
how they were 25 years ago.  Therefore, competing ideals exist based on what everyone has 
known from the previous era and what they want, and aspire to develop for their future. 
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 Looking specifically at Ukraine, under the Soviet Union and the Soviet structure, a small 
group of political elites always made every decision.  It brought about a patron-client 
relationship.  An example of this relationship and how it carried out is seen in the job market.  
Service jobs were often offered in exchange for citizens’ unswerving loyalty.  It ensured a job at 
a particular company once a set of necessary steps were complete.  Other amenities could also be 
awarded like a car, appliances, summer home, vacations and assurance that their children will get 
into good schools.  When Ukraine declared independence and began forming its democratic 
system, the driving force of patron-client relations was removed. 
 The Orange Revolution was an urban social political movement favoring democracy.  
After declaring independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union, the government formed, and 
agreed to institute a democratic system after Communism.  The new system had difficulty 
developing under Kuchma between 1994 and 2004.  Creating a mass protest against corruption 
and cronyism was the public’s way to express their resistance to further manipulation of the 
established system and favoring only elite members of society.  This is what made the Orange 
Revolution a civic movement involving both urban and rural populations of society. 
 Like Serbia and Georgia, Ukraine’s revolution was brought about by a lack of trust in the 
regime.  The administration in power attempted to control the vote’s outcome by adjusting it to 
their personal preference without regard to the public’s voice.  In all three instances, the 
revolutionary leaders – the opposition candidate – called the citizens to protest the current 
regime’s manipulation.  This was the turning point for these movements which clearly declared 
their purpose within the state’s democratic development. 
 Like the revolutions in Georgia and Serbia, Ukraine had an organized youth group trained 
specifically to gather crowds, express their dissatisfaction and revolt with control, non-violently.  
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These youth groups reached out to the younger voters, encouraging their participation by 
expressing their democratic right to support their preferred candidate to lead the state.  They 
emphasized to the younger generation that their contribution via participation was valued and 
needed to be expressed. 
 Their efforts helped in mobilizing the public, bringing in the element of populism, “a 
view and a movement that calls for a mobilization against the rich and powerful in the name of 
the people” (Garner, 1996, 184).  This element of populism helps reinforce the point that the 
Orange Revolution was a norm-oriented movement.  Such a movement looks to “alleviate stress 
by addressing and transforming the normative structure of the system in which it arises” 
(Crossley, 2002, 44).  The Orange Revolution was a movement that released growing political 
tension.  In Ukraine, the people were protesting against the rich and powerful oligarchs. 
 
HISTORY: UKRAINE 
Ukraine: Before and During Soviet Times 
 Before further analyzing the Orange Revolution as a pro-democracy, urban social 
political movement, we must review Ukraine’s history.  This helps contextualize the event while 
acknowledging its relevance within Ukraine’s more recent history.  Understanding previous 
events also aids in greater insight to current events.  Before and during the Soviet era, Ukraine 
struggled to find its position within the world.  Cultural and linguistic similarities with Russia, 
contributed their stronghold on Ukraine.  Throughout history, when Ukraine was self-sufficient 
and striving toward democratic development, stronger outside forces uprooted and changed the 
state’s plans for growth.  Despite this, Ukraine had the basis for democratic development. 
 Before the Soviet Union’s formation, Ukraine experienced several occupations.  Western 
Ukraine was ruled for over 200 years by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburgs in 
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the 1790’s, and in 1867 until the end of World War I by Austria-Hungary.  Ukraine briefly 
experienced independence in 1917.  The Treaty of Versailles partitioned Ukraine to Russia, 
Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia.  By the end of World War II, all of Ukraine was under 
Soviet occupation. 
 In the late 1700’s and early 1800’s, undercurrents of Ukrainian nationalism emerged 
through art and literature.  From 1863 to 1876 “de-Ukrainianization” efforts were present in 
Eastern Ukraine.  Language restrictions were imposed by Russia.  Ukrainian organizations aimed 
to preserve Ukrainian culture and traditions while combating bans.  Ukrainian intelligentsia and 
nationalists expressed in publications and poetry the need to maintain and uphold national 
identity.  This group of intellectual elites felt obliged to promote and preserve all aspects of 
Ukrainian culture to avoid absorption and vanish in the political overtaking. 
 The Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church helped instill 
cohesion among people during the various occupations.  The churches aided to maintain a sense 
of community and stability.  During the Soviet era, Josef Stalin felt threatened by religion as it 
challenged his plan for full Sovietization.  He wanted to assimilate all cultures of the states 
which formed the Soviet Union and abolish religion.  Stalin forced unification between the 
Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.  This dissolved the 
Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church in 1946, which went underground in Ukraine.  Meanwhile, 
faithful abroad continued practicing openly.  If caught practicing faith, consequences were severe 
and included being sent to labor camps in Siberia.  The Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church 
resurfaced in the mid-1980’s.  By August 1990, the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv was 
reinstated as a Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as it was, prior to the Russian Orthodox 
Church’s absorption decades before. 
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 Stalin had full authority of the USSR in 1925.  He intended socialism to transform the 
Soviet Union into a powerhouse.  He wanted to surpass the rest of the world in industrial, 
agricultural and economic production, regardless of cost.  Stalin announced his Five-Year Plan in 
October 1928 and forced participation from everyone.  He required unattainable grain quotas 
which were protested by many Ukrainians working the land and fighting assimilation.  All 
foodstuff was confiscated as quotas began appearing unattainable.  The result was death by 
starvation – the Great Famine of 1932-33, killing 11 million people (Subtelny, 1994, 416). 
 Ukrainian intelligentsia and their nationalism efforts continued in Kyiv and Lviv up until 
World War I.  Many fled to Western Ukraine for their own safety as they promoted upholding all 
aspects of Ukrainian nationalism.  As this became more challenging with the onset of World War 
I and the Russian Revolution; the intellectuals, including Lesya Ukrainka and Ivan Franko 
focused their efforts on preserving the Ukrainian language.  They knew by upholding the 
Ukrainian language, total Russian assimilation would be more challenging for the authorities. 
 During the 1950’s Ukraine’s political elite acknowledged needed modifications to uphold 
Ukrainian nationalism under Soviet suppression.  Upholding nationalism via language, literature, 
culture and collective memory helped maintain group cohesion.  In the 1960’s and 1970’s, 
intense Russification efforts were implemented to counteract the activities of the 1950’s.  Bans 
of practicing any religion continued. 
 Ukrainian nationalism was reinstated in the 1980’s.  Rukh, “Popular Movement for 
Restructuring” actively worked to unite the people and expressed solidarity through nationalism 
while declaring its importance within the state.  Their message was conveyed through pop music, 
quickly catching the youth’s attention.  Anti-Soviet sentiments among Ukrainians grew strong 
after the nuclear disaster at Chornobyl in April 1986.  The catastrophic repercussions were 
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silenced for several days.  By 1990, Rukh’s membership grew to nearly five million, many 
defecting from Ukraine’s Communist Party.  The group’s stronghold came from Western 
Ukraine, who encouraged a nationalistic spirit throughout the state.  Driven by the intellectuals, 
Rukh gained further support from all groups and demographics within Ukraine and also from the 
Diaspora abroad. 
 
Ukraine – Independence 
 On August 24, 1991 Ukraine declared independence.  Leonid Kravchuk was elected 
president of Ukraine on December 1, 1991, when the state also voted for independence from the 
Soviet Union.  With assistance from Rukh, Kravchuk led the state in a pro-Ukrainian direction, 
attempting to overturn the previous decades of de-Ukrainianization efforts.  He acknowledged 
Ukraine must work towards European integration and not rely heavily on Russia for support.  
Kravchuk also emphasized the need to revive the Ukrainian language.  Further emphasis for 
nationalization was incorporated into education including Ukrainian culture, history, literature 
and language.  Said course and more time for the humanities were added while reducing Russian 
grammar and literature lessons (Wanner, 1998, 85).  This was to reestablish Ukrainian 
nationalism and Ukrainian identity for its citizens. 
 Ukraine introduced the coupon as its currency.  It replaced the rouble, showing economic 
and monetary independence from Russia.  The coupon was unsuccessful in stabilizing inflation 
and salaries stagnated.  To help curb inflation and ease economic transition, in 1996, 
Yushchenko replaced the coupon and introduced the hryvnia.  This was one of several 
accomplishments during his term as Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine.  Trading of 
goods internationally began and Ukraine’s internal economic stability was recognized. 
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 Regarding political structure, Ukraine had to start fresh.  The state’s political structure 
and actions of the political leaders were challenged in growth and development.  Ukraine’s early 
politicians, accustomed to Communist-style rule, were active in the Soviet government.  Forming 
the political structure was difficult due to the ingrained Communist-style rule and practices.  The 
democratic system was very new.  Learning and applying principles based in democracy needed 
constant review and consistent use.  Eliminating old, familiar techniques and implementing new 
democratic methodologies opened the door for corruption and political instability.  Examples 
include exchanging goods for services provided (household items for completing work), and 
grand gifts in exchange for loyalty (a summer home to ensure party loyalty). 
 To successfully transition Ukraine politically, economically and nationalistically, 
President Kravchuk needed strong support within government.  He named Leonid Kuchma prime 
minister.  Kuchma ran against Kravchuk for president in 1994 and won.  His primary task upon 
his election was to establish a rubric by which to abide.  He made numerous changes to the 
Constitution.  Reforms were necessary as Ukraine’s Constitution was composed in 1978.  
Agreeing to decided reforms was difficult within government; so, Kuchma initiated his favorite 
tactic to get what he wanted – intimidation.  A new Constitution was adopted in June 1996. 
 Once president, Kuchma began using numerous persuasive tactics to push his personal 
agenda.  Quickly, he implemented a full plan of corruption, fraud, manipulation, abuse and 
ulterior motives of self-given power and cronyism, challenging the state.  The oligarchs emerged, 
as did multiple acts of corruption.  Despite this, Kuchma announced several times that Ukraine 
was ready to strive towards Europeanization and join the EU and WTO. 
 Kuchma ran for reelection in 1999, reiterating the desire for EU membership.  He ran 
against Communist Party leader, Petro Symonenko.  After reelection, the truth about Kuchma 
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surfaced through crony capitalism, economic and political reforms.  He continued intimidating, 
which proved positive for task completion.  In April 2000, Kuchma proposed a referendum on 
constitutional changes, assaulting the democratic consolidation process (Protsyk, 2005, 25). 
 At the start of Kuchma’s second term, Yushchenko was named Prime Minister and 
Tymoshenko Deputy Prime Minister.  Quickly, they saw high amounts of corruption within the 
state.  Both observed corruption’s infiltration into economics and international trade relations.  
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko agreed to focus their efforts to eliminate the oligarchs and clean 
up economic relations in Ukrainian politics.  Realizing their goals in March 2000, President 
Kuchma, said both needed to be destroyed (Wilson, 2005a, 49).  Tymoshenko was fired from her 
post in January 2001.  She did not let her dismissal fall by the wayside.  On February 9, 2001, 
she organized the National Salvation Forum intending to impeach Kuchma.  She was arrested a 
few days later.  Yushchenko was dismissed in April 2001.  Anatolii Kinakh replaced 
Yushchenko, becoming the eleventh Prime Minister since 1991.  This switch was based on 
Kuchma’s anger towards an implemented reform policy to pay pensions. 
 During his presidency, Kuchma had a near monopoly on all power: economic, within the 
media – primarily television – and political, regarding elections.  In 1996, former Prime Minister 
Pavlo Lazarenko bribed Kuchma with $3.7 million as starter capital for mobile phone company, 
Kyïvstar (Wilson, 2005a, 39).  Lazarenko was caught and indicted.  Kryvorizhstal, Ukraine’s 
major steel works company also faced privatization.  In June 2004, the company was privatized 
for $800 million by Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk (Åslund, 2005, 341). 
 Citizens witnessed the oligarchs revel in their rich financial gains from business deals and 
privatizing companies.  Meanwhile, citizens experienced minimal possibility of living a more 
affluent lifestyle.  Their livelihoods stagnated, much like the changes Kuchma proposed during 
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his reelection campaign.  Ukraine’s GDP was steady during the Kuchma administration, though 
inflation was high.  This was caused by corruption by the oligarchs.  To date, rampant corrupt 
acts and political instability affect the economic system and trade relations with the West. 
 With the Kuchma administration’s monopoly on television as a news source, many 
people turned to other media.  Reports were limited and constrained by the government’s strong 
censorship rules.  The public was fully aware of the government’s media manipulation and 
censorship.  Such censorship was carried over from the Soviet era. 
 The attempted cover-up of the kidnapping and decapitation of opposition journalist 
Heorhiy Gongadze in September 2000 challenged the position of Kuchma’s government.  
Gongadze founded the internet-based newspaper Ukrainska Pravda which focused on 
publicizing government acts.  Gongadze published an exposé on September 5, 2000 on 
Kuchma’s confidant, Oleksadr Volkov, setting Kuchma over the edge.  Kuchma was highly 
suspected of direct involvement in Gongadze’s disappearance; ergo, the scandal was dubbed 
“Kuchmagate.”  His involvement was suspected because of audiotapes made by his security 
guard, Mykola Melnychenko, which indicated Kuchma was well informed of the murder.  
Melnychenko and his family fled to Czech Republic fearing their safety.  The publicized murder 
motivated Kuchma and the oligarchs to continue their acts and reinforce relations with Russia. 
 The case’s handling, and the government’s denial appalled citizens when an investigation 
led to inconclusive results.  In revolt, “Ukraine without Kuchma” began in central Kyiv fighting 
to impeach Kuchma based on the murder scandal.  The initial campaign amounted to 20,000-
30,000 protestors.  A second wave of demonstrations occurred February 6, 2001, when 
parliament reopened (Wilson, 2005a, 58).  The movement failed because organizers were unable 
to build their coalition to the strength necessary to demand exposure of the pending case. 
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 Despite the Gongadze scandal’s deteriorating effects, the Kuchma regime prepared for 
the 2004 presidential election.  Kuchma and the oligarchs took advantage of their powers and 
began planning their fight via sabotage.  The world quietly observed Kuchma’s actions.  His 
forcefulness and brazen efforts to assure task completion done per his preferences led Kuchma to 
be uninvited to the NATO Summit in November 2002 in Prague.  He still attended and was 
shunned by his peers (D’Anieri, 2003, 59). 
 Kuchma was reluctant to step down as president as his second term concluded.  He 
realized there was no possibility for the two-term maximum rule to be overturned for him.  As a 
strong member of the oligarchs and supporters of their activities, Kuchma needed to hand pick 
someone to represent them in the election.  Selecting a person to support; needed thought. 
 Yanukovych was Ukraine’s third prime minister during Kuchma’s second presidential 
term.  Kuchma knew Yanukovych’s reputation.  He was confident that corruption would become 
a way of life in Ukraine if Yanukovych was elected.  However, Kuchma did not fully trust his 
colleague.  Even so, Yanukovych quickly became Kuchma’s right hand man as prime minister.  
Corruption and other ill-related acts already occurred within government and ran rampant once 
Yanukovych became prime minister.  Naming Yanukovych to this position was a strategic move 
within the oligarchs and their growing clique. 
 Yanukovych stood out among the oligarchs with his brash personality and reputation.  He 
endured a rough childhood in Donetsk, the most criminalized city in Ukraine.  In 1968, when 
Yanukovych was 18, he was imprisoned for robbery.  Two years later, he was charged with 
assault.  His harsh and uncouth personality emerged during incarceration.  While in prison, 
Yanukovych earned the nickname “kham” or scum and established himself as a verbally and 
physically violent person (Wilson, 2005a, 13).  His criminal records disappeared in 1978 and 
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resurfaced in 2004 in Moscow.  Yanukovych’s criminal past became a contention point for 
Ukrainian citizens during the 2004 elections. 
 To deflect from the negative concerns, the oligarchs gave Yanukovych a makeover.  
They dressed him in well-fitted, presentable suits and sent him to the United States to learn how 
to speak like a politician.  This effort did not improve Yanukovych’s image with the public.  
Further dislike and ridicule emerged when Yanukovych officially submitted his candidacy 
documents.  His Curriculum Vitae was laden with spelling and grammatical errors and was 
submitted hand-written to the Central Election Commission. 
 Viktor Yushchenko was the opposition candidate, favored by the people.  Yushchenko’s 
activity in politics began during his time as Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine.  He took 
the position in 1993 and held until 1999, when he became prime minister.  After his dismissal as 
prime minister, Yushchenko created his political party “Our Ukraine” in January 2002.  The 
party emphasized and promoted Ukrainian language and cultural nationalism.  The parliamentary 
election of 2002 helped solidify Our Ukraine’s position in Ukrainian politics after winning 101 
of the 450 parliamentary seats (Yushchenko, 2007). 
 Tymoshenko supported Yushchenko and held similar political views.  Her career began 
and boomed during the mid 1990’s in the oil industry.  She entered politics when nominated to 
run in the 1996 parliamentary elections.  She became deputy chief of the “Hromada Party” 
(Tymoshenko, 2007).  In late 1999 and early 2000, Tymoshenko started learning Ukrainian.  She 
projected a nationalistic image and furthered it by forming her own political party – the 
Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) Party.  Her party was in opposition to Kuchma and his 
administration.  In December, 2001, her political party was reformed.  With the reformation, it 
was nicknamed BYuTy. 
21 
 
 Our Ukraine refocused its platform just before the 2004 presidential elections.  Instead of 
accentuating economic reforms and Ukrainian nationalism, the party stressed European 
integration, ascension into the EU, NATO and WTO.  On July 2, 2004, Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko joined forces and announced their partnership for the campaign.  Together, they 
formed the People’s Power Coalition.  Their pact ensured Tymoshenko would not run for 
president.  Instead, she would support Yushchenko and campaign for him.  Additional campaign 
rallying support came from politicians Borys Tarasyuk and Yuri Kostenko (Åslund, Anders and 
Michael McFaul, eds., 2006, 39). 
 
BACKGROUND: ORANGE REVOLUTION 
 Kuchma and the oligarchs flourished rapidly becoming multi-millionaires filching gained 
profits from business deals.  Along with the manipulations and abuse of power, Kuchma still did 
not want to be exempt from the election.  He argued that the two-term maximum rule for 
presidents was not applicable to him as it went into effect after his inauguration in 1994.  Many 
did not support his reasoning. 
 Towards the end of his presidency, Kuchma pushed to give parliament more power.  At 
the same time, Kuchma assured his authority remained intact.  This complimented his ruling 
hand in matters and caused the political system to be more parliamentary than presidential-
parliamentary.  Doubts were raised if the reforms would strengthen democracy and develop 
governance in Ukraine (Protsyk, 2005, 26).  This systemic change was made official on 
December 8, 2004, and gave protestors during the Orange Revolution additional fighting fuel.  
Kuchma was already strongly disliked for the malevolent tactics he used against parliament and 
Ukraine’s citizens during his second term. 
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 Yushchenko, out of office, saw state development stagnate.  He wanted to implement 
changes in the state and decided to campaign for president.  Tymoshenko also wanted changes.  
She and Yushchenko held the same opinions and created their pact, guaranteeing her support for 
Yushchenko.  Tymoshenko’s party – YTB, and Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine became allies in the 
election, while maintaining their own political identities. 
 Yushchenko’s driving forces were his political party, campaign promises and argument 
that the Kuchma administration detoured from its platform five years prior.  He vocalized that 
the public’s expectations of the Kuchma administration were never met.  The younger generation 
wanted to see more growth and state development from the government.  Developing Ukraine 
both economically and democratically would help with exchanges between neighbors and 
trading partners.  Working with international business partners, as well as possible study abroad 
and other exchange opportunities, would also greatly benefit the youth. 
 The overall feeling that life in Ukraine was no longer improving and state development 
stagnated, emerged among citizens during the Kuchma administration.  This sentiment grew 
stronger during the 2004 presidential campaign.  The stagnation directly affected the public’s 
lives, making everyday life more difficult than before.  This mobilized citizens who wanted to 
right the wrongs they saw.  They felt that a controlled and limited set of information was 
presented.  The expected growth and development briefly witnessed by citizens from ten to 
fifteen years earlier suddenly stopped.  Instead, the privatization and re-privatization of 
companies and businesses grew.  Only a political figurehead could stand up and lead the masses 
to push for change, verbalizing the previously sensed discourse.  The opportunity to demand 
change emerged through the presidential elections. 
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 Like elections in other states, Yushchenko and Yanukovych had very different political 
platforms.  Both candidates rallied and visited cities throughout Ukraine while connecting with 
voters.  Additionally, both received support from varied demographics.  Yushchenko’s 
supporters were younger citizens.  Older people receiving pensions and reliant on state funds 
primarily supported Yanukovych.  Yanukovych’s platform focused on returning Ukraine to the 
ways of the Soviet Union.  He argued all major institutions were established during that era and 
therefore, they should return to the Soviet structure (Copsey, 2005, 101).  From his first 
campaign day, Yushchenko proposed democracy and democratic growth if elected president.  He 
incorporated this as a major theme in his political platform knowing the public wanted change.  
With this, he became the face of democracy and hope of a democratic system within Ukraine. 
 In December 2003, Kuchma forewarned that the upcoming presidential elections would 
be the dirtiest in Ukraine’s history.  All acts of trickery Kuchma and his cronies planned were 
devised for strategic implementation while denying involvement.  The plans emerged as Kuchma 
realized the vote must be rigged to result in his favor.  A key trick used during the election was 
manipulating absentee voting, a very easy way to stuff ballot boxes favoring Yanukovych 
(Oleshko, 2004a, 39).  Many of Yushchenko’s campaign posters were vandalized and removed 
by the Kuchma administration.  More tricks emerged through television, claims that 
Yushchenko’s candidacy was part of an American plot, violent acts, extremist groups, 
intimidating and forcing regional governors and state institutions to support Yanukovych, or risk 
unemployment (Kuzio, 2005, 42). 
 The most severe trick, directed at Yushchenko, nearly took his life.  He had dinner with 
Security Services of Ukraine, SBU head Ihor Smeshko and deputy, Volodymyr Satsiuk on 
September 5, 2004.  Yushchenko received an intense dose of dioxin poison during the dinner.  
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He was rushed to Austria for medical attention later that night.  Kuchma is highly suspected in 
being involved in plotting this activity as he worked closely with Smeshko and Satsiuk.  A few 
months later, the specific dioxin was confirmed as Agent Orange.  While recovering in Austria, 
Tymoshenko stepped in and campaigned on Yushchenko’s behalf.  After his return home upon 
initial treatment from the poisoning, 70,000 people welcomed him (Wilson, 2005a, 123). 
 The presidential election was scheduled for October 31, 2004.  Over 20 presidential 
candidates were listed on the ballot.  Both Yushchenko and Yanukovych won 39% of the overall 
vote.  A winner was not produced, forcing a runoff vote on November 21, 2004.  Preparing for 
the runoff, Tymoshenko urged citizens to get out to vote and publicly stand up for Yushchenko. 
 After the runoff vote on November 21, the Central Election Commission declared 
Yanukovych president, citing he won by a 3% margin over Yushchenko.  In response, 
Yushchenko immediately called his supporters to come to Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
(Independence Square) and protest the announced results non-violently.  From his first call to 
action for protest, Yushchenko stressed the necessity of remaining non-violent.  Maintaining 
calm in an environment with high tension and emotions, Yushchenko and Pora knew that the 
protest’s pro-democracy movement must be nonviolent to avoid a possible riot situation.  He felt 
all human lives were highly valuable. 
 As Kuchma controlled many of the television stations, many citizens turned to other 
media for updates on the campaign and election.  The Orange Revolution is distinguished as 
being one of the first technologically-based post-socialist urban political movements.  Use of cell 
phones, text messaging, internet and email played a notable role among the people.  
Technologically-based media aided in organizing and managing the crowds and their 
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participants.  The use of technology to this extent is strongly acknowledged.  Between 2003 and 
December 2004, about 12.37% of Ukraine’s population used the internet (Dyczok, 2006, 220). 
 Every development in the protest was published on the web, giving the world a view 
from the trenches, witnessing the event’s details as they happened.  The Orange Revolution was 
the first major movement detailed and broadcast through the internet for the world to see and 
share in the experience simultaneously.  Yushchenko’s team and Pora utilized technology to 
forward critical information through non-traditional media in Ukraine.  This maintained their 
momentum and organization during the movement. 
 
PORA 
 Yushchenko received additional support from Pora (literally translated “Now’s the 
Time”).  The group acted as a networking organization which aided to unite Yushchenko’s 
supporters.  Pora’s main goal was to reinstall democracy and democratic practices in Ukraine 
and requested these rights through civil actions.  It was a residentially based organization and 
“forged a sphere of local citizenship that involves citizens directly in the management of their 
collective affairs and that mobilizes them when necessary” (Holson, 2008, 247). 
 Pora, inaugurated in March 2004, became the largest state-wide network of Non-
Governmental Organizations, activities and volunteers (Åslund, and McFaul, eds., 2006, 86).  
The group overcame the challenge of uniting social, cultural and administrative differences as 
well as within Ukraine, regional diversity for democracy.  It was organized through core leaders, 
a volunteer network, informational campaign and the push for free and fair elections.  In total, 
150 different national, regional and local NGO’s joined Pora’s efforts (Åslund, 2006, 88). 
 The group’s core members completed extensive training in crowd control, and non-
violent practices.  They aided to maintain a civil environment in the tent camps, where many 
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people resided during the Orange Revolution day in and day out.  Pora networked with 
businesses to gain additional support and effectively communicate information and requests for 
help.  During the 2004 campaign, Pora informed and mobilized voters.  Their slogans 
encouraged younger citizens to vote, promoted anti-Kuchma sentiment and held “practice” 
protests during the campaign.  Pora relied heavily on technology to communicate critical 
information to their supporters via the internet, emails and text messages. 
 The group focused their efforts on the younger voters, near university campuses and 
within student organizations.  Through rapport building, extensive training and non-violent 
reaction, reliance on technology and targeting a specific demographic of the population, Pora 
became a strong ally for Yushchenko.  Ultimately, Pora became the backbone of public support.  
Combining these facets with their mission helped involve the youth and encourage them to voice 
their preference for the next president and what they desire next for the state.  In contrast, 
Yanukovych viewed Pora as a terrorist group, which in turn caused more youth to dislike him 
(Kuzio, 2005, 40). 
 Pora helped Yushchenko address the two main targets of the social movement.  He, 
along with Tymoshenko challenged the power holders of the current administration while Pora 
worked with and led the general public.  This way, pressure was put on everyone – leaders and 
the masses who follow them.  Pora was influential in keeping the crowds calm and offered 
direction to refute the announced election outcome.  Yushchenko’s grassroots nature of the 
campaign also sensitized the population to the overall cause they were fighting for – an honest 




ORAL HISTORIES FROM THE ORANGE REVOLUTION______________ 
 
CRITERIA 
 After reviewing general information and characteristics of post-socialist urban political 
movements, and the events before and during the Orange Revolution, it is necessary to review 
testimonials and oral histories of this specific event.  Oral histories not only confirm the 
historical events documented by researchers, they also add a human element to the Orange 
Revolution.  These testimonials of personal experiences add value to the movement as it would 
not have occurred without the participation of the people residing in the state. 
 To complement the already published findings on this particular topic, I sought out new 
research.  My primary goal of this research was to disprove that the Orange Revolution was 
merely an event where the public and citizens released a burst of pent up frustrations.  I wanted 
to prove that the protest and event as a whole occurred independently from any other event or 
activity.  I predicted that I would find the Orange Revolution occurred resulting from numerous 
gradual changes that were too slow for the public to see an end result.  My overall hope in 
conducting my research was to better understand the event’s outcome and how it advances 
Ukraine’s democratic growth. 
 To conduct my research, I needed to set criteria for my prospective participants.  While 
initiating my interviews, I needed to qualify participants before interviewing them.  Potential 
participants were located at the time of their interviews in the United States, specifically, Boston, 
Chicago and Minneapolis.  Others were located throughout Ukraine.  Requirements of my 
participants included that they were at least 14 years old in 1991 and have memories of life under 
socialism.  Additionally, my interview candidates all lived in Ukraine, preferably in Kyiv, 
Ukraine’s capital, during the Orange Revolution.  Subsequent emigration was acceptable.  I 
began my recruitment process by asking people already within my circle of acquaintances to 
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relate their experiences to me.  From there, I asked these acquaintances to aid me in recruiting 
others in their wider circle of contacts to reach out to me directly and relay their experiences, if 
they so desired.  These people, beyond my circle, had the opportunity to decline participation 
without my ever knowing they were contacted.  In total, about 20 people provided their histories 
and experiences.  These histories were told by participants via in person interviews, Skype and 
email exchanges.  The questions I asked during all interviews were as follows: 
 Tell me about life during Soviet times; specifically during the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
 What was life like at the start of independence? 
 Tell me your memories during the state of Ukraine’s independence. 
 What changes occurred immediately after independence?  How long did these same 
changes continue? 
 What were the general sentiments about life during Kuchma’s second term in office?  For 
example – Was it easier or harder to buy items or obtain services?  What kinds of items 
were available for purchase that were not possible during Soviet times? 
 During Kuchma's second term in office and the time leading up the 2004 elections, what 
were your thoughts and viewpoints on politics? 
 Share with me your overall feelings, sentiments leading up to the election.  Did you 
experience any changes in your own life that were affected by the upcoming election?  
Did the upcoming election itself make you take a more pro-active stance? 
 Did you participate in the election?  Had the election happened under different 
circumstances, would you have participated by voting?  Why or why not? 
 During the Orange Revolution, what were your feelings, sentiments?  Did your friends, 
family, colleagues have the same feelings? 
 During these elections, what was the most prominent moment for you? 
 What were your expectations from these elections and the revolution? 
 How did you communicate with others during the Orange Revolution?  Telephone?  Text 
message?  Email? 
 Who did you communicate with outside of your primary location during the protests to 
exchange updates?  Where were they located? 
 Tell me about the atmosphere during the revolution. 
 How did the atmosphere change, if at all, after the revolution? 
 What were your primary expectations that would occur as a result of the revolution? 
 Tell me about life now after the Orange Revolution.  Has your life improved or 
worsened?  Did the circumstances change? 
 Did the result of the Orange Revolution directly change your life in any way?  How? 
 During your entire life, when did you feel the most patriotic/nationalistic? 
 Should an event similar to the Orange Revolution occur again in Ukraine, would you 
participate?  Why or why not? 
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 Interviews were conducted either in Ukrainian or English, depending on the participant’s 
language preference.  Interviews conducted in Ukrainian were translated by me into English.  All 
names have been changed to conceal the participants’ identity.  Further anonymity is presented 
by not identifying my participants’ hometowns, unless they disclosed this information in 
referencing their location.  My focus was to interview people who participated in the main 
demonstrations of the Orange Revolution in Kyiv.  However, I also interviewed people 
throughout Ukraine.  The feedback and answers received from these interviews in some ways 
challenged the acknowledged division within the state.  Religiously, linguistically and culturally 
Ukraine has been divided east and west.  The responses I received to my questions eliminated 
some of the perceived division.  At the same time however, difference in opinions and 
experiences remain. 
 To start, I asked my participants about their recollections of life before 1991, during 
Soviet times.  A simpler life during the Soviet Union existed.  There were few surprises from day 
to day.  Resources were available to people at a set standard. 
 
Soviet Ukraine 
 “This was my childhood and school years.  I wasn’t into politics yet… but I learned…  
From this era, I have positive memories as a young person and I was content.  I remember one 
time, I noticed my father, by the dim light, listening to the radio program “Voice of America.”  
Dad was disturbed that I saw this, and when I asked him what he was doing, he answered “I’m a 
Communist – I am allowed to listen to them.”  As I grew up a bit, I often listened to “Svoboda,” 
“Voice of America” and other such programs.  I even searched for radio stations and tuned into 
them…  Listening to the channels was fairly difficult – due to the Soviet work of frequency 





 “My childhood was during this era.  From my childhood, I have good memories, so I 
have good impressions of this era.  During this time, many people had access to full rights, but 
not everyone.  Above all, people felt more protected, secure than what they did during the 1990’s 
and early 2000’s.” 
~~~Volodya. 
 
 “There wasn’t much joy or major excitement for anyone.  It often felt very sad, solemn.  
We were corralled and herded about like cattle.  Individualism did not exist.  During the Soviet 
era, there was nothing – no hope, no grand opportunities.  You just did your everyday activities 
and put one foot in front of the other.  Conformity abounded.” 
~~~Bohdan. 
 
 “I was born in the early 1950’s.  In Pidhajtsi, all my life, there was the foundation of a 
church.  My parents, aunt and uncle with their family and others from the village started building 
the church before World War II.  The church’s foundation and walls about five feet high stood 
complete.  The War paused everything.  When Russian occupation occurred and along with the 
banning of practicing any form of religion, including Catholicism, the building of the church 
stopped completely.  The partially built structure remained dormant through my adult years.  It 
wasn’t that resources and building materials were not available.  These items were available – 
just not for these types of structure. 
 Prior to my birth, Pidhajtsi’s general population consisted of three groups of people.  
About one third of the population was Ukrainians, another third was Polish and the remaining 
third consisted of a Jewish community.  Of course, this changed.  By the time I was a young girl, 
many of the Polish and Jewish populations left and moved elsewhere.  Ukrainians remained and 
became the majority of the population.  Even a few people from other villages moved to our 
small town.  A lot of “Moskali” – those from Russia – were transplanted and moved to Pidhajtsi.  
They never spoke or learned a word of Ukrainian, and only spoke Russian to communicate.  One 
of my neighbors who lived down the road was one of these transplanted people.  During her 





 “The Soviet years of the 1970’s were my childhood and the 1980’s – my youth.  From 
1970 through 1986, was perhaps the most peaceful and mild for people in Ukraine within the last 
40 years.  Truly, during that time, all of the citizens of the USSR lived in almost equal status.  
When we talk about disparity during that time, some of today’s historians use the difference in 
earnings and economic security as well as the possibility of those who held high positions in the 
party.  It is worth remembering that if this difference existed, it was hardly noticeable.  The 
difference in economic status was not high.  Differences were developing in the area of 
professions, i.e., their higher earnings, and not as a result of thievery of what belongs to the 
people.  That is thievery of what belongs to the people.  That is, thievery of state properties, as it 
is happening today. 
 I was born and grew up in a simple, working village family.  In the early 1960’s, my 
parents moved from the village to Kirovohrad.  My mother got a job in a brick factory and my 
father worked for the police department.  After I was born, my father changed his job and 
worked as a carpenter in construction, and my mother left her job and managed the household. 
 After working three years in construction, my father, in 1970 received without any cost to 
him, from the government, a new two-room apartment.  It is worth noting that this opportunity 
was also available to most residents of Soviet Ukraine.  During that period, there was no 
unemployment.  My father earned pay that was sufficient to support his family – wife and a 
child.  His wages covered the cost of groceries, apartment maintenance, buy all clothing, help 
parents, take family vacations and maintain some savings. 
 Food choices were considerably lesser than today.  There were very few imported 
products.  However, the quality was very high in comparison to what is available today.  
Nonetheless, foodstuff was adequate.  There was very good food selection.  The public had very 
good opportunities to buy for the holidays a sufficient quantity of fine quality production at 
reasonable prices. 
 From 1970-1985, citizens of the USSR and Ukraine wore clothing made in the USSR.  
Imported items were handled exclusively by high-end establishments.  Domestically-made 
products were of low quality and at low prices.  The style of clothing and footwear were not of 
modern design.  Foreign cars were not sold, and the domestic units were not manufactured in 
sufficient quantities – therefore, shortages existed. 
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 In the 1980’s, all citizens of the USSR had full medical coverage at no cost to them.  
Clinics were available even in small villages.  Regional and district hospitals were equipped with 
all necessary medical technology, hospital beds and such.  All healthcare, food and time in the 
hospital were at no charge to every citizen.” 
~~~Viktor. 
 
 “I do not associate myself with politics whatsoever.  I’m not one bit interested in the 
topic, though life is influenced by politics.  I’m forced to acknowledge this fact, despite my 
personal feelings.  My passion lies in my hobby – philately.  I can see politics emerge via 
postage stamps.  During the Soviet Union era, stamps were very bland.  Only a few colors were 
used and the images were basic.  The images were neutral within the Soviet Republics.” 
~~~Taras. 
 
 “The educational system in the Soviet Union was one of structure that was consistent 
throughout.  Curriculum was highly focused on sciences and math.  The mode of language for 
classes was Russian.  After high school, specialization degrees and vocational schools were very 
popular.  Finals were given at the end of every school year.  Sometimes how well a student did 
on their oral final exams did not correctly reflect how well they knew the material, but what kind 
of gift they presented to their instructor in appreciation for the knowledge they shared.” 
~~~Mychajlo. 
 
Independence – 1991 
 My participants also discussed their recollections from when Ukraine declared 
independence and the initial years that followed.  They noticed many changes especially in 
lifestyle and resources.  Feelings of uplift and excitement were very common among my 
participants along with some initial concerns once changes became noticeable. 
 
 “Up until independence in 1991, I remember things being quite sad, almost dismal.  
When Ukraine declared independence, there was a lot of happiness and excitement.  Everyone 
wanted to celebrate, but after a while, shock set in and the questions of “Now what?  Where do 
we go from here?  What do we do next?” regarding democratic building came about. 
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 I quickly noticed changes in my classes at the time of independence.  Most of my lessons 
in school were taught in Ukrainian even before independence.  I did have a few classes taught in 
Russian.  Classes taught in Russian, including Russian language were quickly minimized.  I can 
still speak to someone in Russian if or when necessary and do it with ease and also transition 
between Ukrainian and Russian.  However, as a Ukrainian citizen, and out of principle, I prefer 
to speak with others in Ukraine using Ukrainian.” 
~~~Mykola. 
 
 “The curriculum in Ukrainian schools began to change.  Science and math subjects 
remained strong.  Subjects relating more to Ukrainian language, history and cultural studies were 
introduced and Russian subjects became less frequent.  The biggest change was in fact, the push 
to include Ukrainian language classes and ensure they were being taught in schools.” 
~~~Mychajlo.  
 
 “I was always intrigued by American culture as a kid.  I wanted to know more about 
American life, lifestyle, culture – everything.  After independence, you started seeing American 
influences come into Ukraine.  The most iconic association with American lifestyle introduced to 
Ukraine after 1991 was McDonald’s.  Though, the novelty of it is more fascinating than 
anything.  Like Americans, we could now order a Big Mac and fries.” 
~~~Bohdan. 
 
 “When Ukraine became independent, postage stamps had a more nationalistic sentiment 
within them.  The Trident was being implemented almost as often as an American flag for 
common postage in the United States.  Flowers, especially poppies and bachelor buttons which 
are both popular in Ukraine were also visible.  Colors on the stamps became more vibrant and 
images more detailed.  The stamps grew into pieces of artwork.” 
~~~Taras. 
 
 “The church that started being built even before I was born remained untouched until 
independence.  Shortly after Ukraine declared independence, when it became more acceptable to 
practice religion publicly, the people of Pidhajtsi worked to complete the church’s construction.  
Around 1997, the church was finished and we were actually able to start holding Masses, 
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weddings, baptisms and celebrate religious holidays.  A few years later, we started building a 
second church in Pidhajtsi.” 
~~~Nadia. 
 
 “Everything from the stores vanished just before independence.  Life became terrible.  
Right after independence, authorities elevated themselves in importance and people were then 
lowered in value.” 
~~~Maksym 
 
 “Items became more available, but there was nothing to buy them with – no money.  
Nothing was stable.” 
~~~Danylo. 
 
 “During Soviet times, people did not have much money, but goods were available.  After 
independence, people had money but goods were scarce.  This is the biggest thing I remember 
from this time.  The shift from goods being available to their lacking and the shift in funds to get 
goods was very pivotal for me.  This change really struck me one day in 1992, when I went out 




 “Goods were limited and their quality was not always the best.  I was fortunate to receive 
on occasion bits of care packages of gently used clothes from my cousin’s relatives in Canada.  I 
would get the occasional pair of pants or sweater if certain clothing items did not fit my uncle.  
We would all wear these items with great care and pride.  In one package, my aunt received a 
bottle of perfume.  She used the perfume only for special occasions.” 
~~~Vasyl. 
 
 “Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, citizens, on average, lived a fairly good and 
comfortable life.  In general, people had access to most all basic necessities.  I think the Soviet 
Union fell apart because of the communist ideology and the government system.  It was during 
the mid-1980s that the government started having difficulties in monitoring the pre-set, high 
standard of living for its citizens. 
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 The economic structure was based on the principle of strict control by the central 
government.  From my point of view, in the beginning of the 1990’s, the complex socio-
economic relations, the development of lawlessness, corruption, the lack of laws regulating the 
transition to a market economy, the desire of the party and government functionaries of the 
USSR to divide political and economic influences, was the cause of the breakup of the Soviet 
Union.  At that time, and thereafter, there was no conversation about the desire of Ukraine to 
become independent.  This idea was trumped by the functionaries of the Communist criminals 
with the desire of self-enrichment and to take ownership of the state’s wealth. 
 When Ukraine gained independence, in the beginning of the 1990’s; that was the period 
of expectations and disappointments.  It was the beginning of poverty, unemployment, rapid 
development of criminal activities.  Extremely high inflation, ruining of business establishments 
by the wild privatization, the senseless distribution of properties and after their take over were 
sold dirt cheap as though they were pieces of scrap metal.  The public could not take its savings 
from the banks; the accounts were frozen.  These were very difficult years.  But, at the same 
time, people believed that any day the statesmen would institute law and order.  Yes, during this 
period many people were becoming very rich very quickly, but some not for long.  The standard 
of living for most people was low.  City dwellers were growing gardens massively. 
 Some establishments were not paying the workers their salaries.  Instead, the idea of 
bartering was used.  In other words, whatever the factory produced, the workers would receive 
that product as compensation – bricks, sugar, furniture, alcohol, etc.  Also, poor quality items 
like clothing, food, alcoholic beverages, etc were produced in massive quantities, all because of 
the lack of government controls.” 
~~~Viktor. 
 
 “I was studying in college at this time and majoring in history.  I actively participated in 
events through various student groups focused in politics.  I helped out with the American-
Canadian organization “Active Freedom” in agitation and went to public rallies. 
 Regarding goods and services, things were not pleasant…  The coupon was introduced. 
 When working on my graduate studies, my interest in politics continued.  Truly, there 
was resistance of the idea of popularizing and using Ukrainian.  In Luhansk, you almost never 
heard it anywhere (aside from the smaller towns, villages and handful of oblasts).  Other than 
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that, Ukrainian was hardly used during that time.  Government officials started using Ukrainian 
more regularly and started publishing laws and all official documents in Ukrainian.  There was a 
definite rise in crime, blaming it on someone, some wickedness – hit men, gunmen were hired to 
kill businessmen and other leaders.  But everyday life was not affected much.” 
~~~Petro. 
 
 “Sneaky, clever people started grabbing at the goods that were around.  Thievery started 
throughout.  The people who cared for Ukraine could not fully manage the state rebuilding.  The 
higher leadership was organized with a few patriots and mostly of brotherhoods of professionals 
(career men) and thieves.  Capital gains started to grow with the authorities, the bandits started 
using bribery, buying off the leaders and law makers. 
 The years after independence, I was studying at the institute.  Goods for purchase in 
stores were limited, transportation was unstable.  Regarding law, total corruption did not exist 
yet, so they could still control the bandits.  They dimmed the lights on economy. 
 At the institute in 1993, problems started with the heating and electricity.  They started 
withholding, delaying issuance of paychecks.  This continued for years.  Instead of pay, they 
gave IOU or barter notes, then, they paid in the form of goods – vodka among other items.” 
~~~Volodya. 
 
 “In school, I had some classes taught in Russian.  We had lessons in Russian before 
independence.  After independence, class information was less frequently being taught in 
Russian and more in Ukrainian.  By the time my younger sister started grade school in Ternopil, 
there were no more classes taught in Russian.  My sister finished her undergraduate studies in 
Journalism in Kyiv.  There, a mixed hybrid of Ukrainian and Russian “surzhyk” is spoken.  My 
sister understands surzhyk as can I.  However, my sister who is 20 years old has difficulty 
communicating in Russian, or understanding someone from Eastern Ukraine speaking Russian.” 
~~~Sophia. 
 
The Years Following Independence – The Kuchma Administration 
 At the time of independence, changes emerged and aided in developing the state.  
Changes in economics, news media, education and other sectors continued gradually once 




 “The first years of independence, I was not interested in politics.  My primary focus was 
my studies.  During this time, the local economy and businesses worked fairly well and changed 
for the worst 10-15 years later.  There was a split between citizens on the language issue.  The 
changes continued until Kuchma issued dictatorship.  There was also a political party created, 
named “Jedyna Ukrajina” (United Ukraine).  With this party, you were forced to vote.  They 
dictated not only participation in the elections, but also how members were to vote. 
 Under Kuchma, newspapers and TV only reported on nice, positive events.  These stories 
were the kind that you would forget rather quickly.  Simply put – they were show pieces.  All 
democratic reforms were bunched and silenced.  Discussions on leading political and democratic 
processes were kept silent.” 
~~~Volodya. 
 
 “Voting for Kuchma’s second term was regulated – that is, dictating influences on the 
electoral committee and the electoral process were present.  With that, the fact that Symonenko 
was a Communist – so above all, it did not sway anyone one way or the other.  Though, it was 
Kuchma who rode on this fact and used it to his advantage to earn more votes.” 
~~~Petro. 
 




 “With reference to Kuchma – he in fact was in charge of Ukraine in 1992-1993 as Prime 
Minister.  With exclusive power to issue laws he was president from 1994-2005.  It is worth 
noting that during Kuchma’s leadership there were some negative moments: wild hording of 
capital, in the 1990’s the general population becoming much poorer, the growth of lawlessness 
and corruption, no definite direction in foreign policy.  On the positive side: new constitution, 
and creation of some foundation for basic laws, in the beginning of the 2000’s stabilization of the 
economy, renewal of more normal pricing system of products and elimination of bartering, and 
improvements of basic pay to workers. 
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 As to the issue of pricing and availability of products, I would say that the availability 
improved; there were more products to choose from.  However, the quality in general was not up 
to par.  Obviously, as soon as the very rich appeared – so did the good quality and the best 
products.  Unfortunately, most of the population lived and still lives in poverty – the earnings are 
low and the prices are constantly increasing. 
 With reference to the political issues with Kuchma, in my opinion, the foreign policy was 
undefined (non-directional).  Moves were made in the direction of integration with the EU and at 
the same time there was evidence and desire to collaborate and work closer with Russia and the 
ex-Soviet Republics.  The internal situation in the mid-2000’s was, by that time, different 
oligarch classes were so organized that they had great influence on the economy as well as 
political development.  Consequently, there were conflicts amongst them, fighting over the 
economy and the political life.  The “Ukraine Without Kuchma” movement was also a result of 
this struggle.  To put it more accurately, it was the way of fighting.” 
~~~Viktor. 
 
 “Looking back on it, Kuchma was a terrible leader for Ukraine.  He did not do a thing for 
the state.  He wasted time for the people, manipulated the instilled government system to suit 
himself.  Plus, he derailed advancement opportunities for Ukraine to strive for eventual 
memberships to the WTO and EU in a timely manner, which was projected and promised.  My 
parents often discussed their hopes after independence.  Their expectation was things would 
change and improve in Ukraine with much fairness, speed and ease.” 
~~~Sophia. 
 
 “The availability of goods and services are not to be credited to the Kuchma regime.  The 
end objective was international integration and globalization.  Companies during this time, with 
criminalistic capital had to put their money somewhere.  The numerous migrant workers 
(employees) then, also brought money into Ukraine, and built kiosks for small start up 
businesses.  The big businesses were not functional, so people sought alternative ways to make 
money.  For example, they worked abroad, exported goods to sell in other countries or imported 
goods to sell in Ukraine, carried goods and sold them.  During this time, some became parasites, 





 “Initially, when Kuchma became president, it appeared that opportunities for new growth 
and the potential for grand life changes emerged.  A sense of freedom opened up and became 
more welcomed by people.” 
~~~Maryna. 
 
 “During the Kuchma era, the educational system really changed and reforms came into 
place.  Standardized tests began to be implemented to help combat corruption in schools.  It was 
a way to enforce an even standard for equal opportunity in education.  This was the biggest way 
you could see de-politicization efforts and transition to democracy within the education sector of 
society.  Specialization degrees continued, but they became less popular.  The higher educational 
system changed to more of a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree system.  All of this was to fight for 
the quality of education. 
 Montessori schools began.  Pre-school is now for children between six months and six 
years.  Some 22,000 public secondary schools existed.  Elementary schools have students from 
first through fourth grades.  These students must take a few standardized tests.  Middle school 
students – grades five through nine, are tested in five subjects – language, history, math, and 
humanities (English, Business and Arts).  High school students, grades ten and eleven, have 
exams in history, math, language, science and one optional exam subject.” 
~~~Mychajlo. 
 
 “During the times of the Soviet Union, Russian was taught in school and part of the 
curriculum.  Within a matter of a few years after independence, Russian was no longer a subject 
taught in schools in Western Ukraine.  It was totally eliminated from the curriculum.  English 
became a more popular subject in the classrooms.  My niece teaches English in Pidhajtsi in the 
grade school.  She taught herself and now she’s sharing her self-taught knowledge to her 
students.  My niece often acknowledges that resources for both herself and her students are quite 
limited.  My children studied in the United States at universities.  They have brought and sent 
materials for their cousin to use as study aids and educational tools.  They’ve also helped their 





 “Under Kuchma, more American iconic things entered into the Ukrainian market.  
McDonald’s started opening more locations throughout Ukraine – the first location of the 
restaurant was in Kyiv.  At first, it was neat to get a taste of American lifestyle in Ukraine 
through McDonald’s.  However, it is very expensive.  The cost of going out to eat at McDonald’s 
nearly equals the cost of a dinner at a nice sit-down restaurant. 
 Again, anything that is iconic of America is expensive.  I’ve seen Nike and Adidas 
running shoes priced at $300 per pair in stores in Lviv.  I was in the United States for the 
summer of 2004.  This was my first time in America.  I walked in to TJ Maxx one day and saw 
the same shoes I saw in Lviv, and they were priced at $40.  I was shocked at the price variance.  
In my opinion, I felt like the markups on American-associated goods, is like waving a carrot in 
Ukrainian citizens’ faces.  They way it came off was, “You know you want it, it is there and 
available, but unattainable for most.”” 
~~~Bohdan. 
 
 “One thing that changed for me within my job after Kuchma took office was an increase 
in travel abroad.  I work as a chemical engineer and have been with the same company for many, 
many years.  I traveled occasionally throughout Ukraine and into Russia a couple times before 
1991.  After Kuchma became president, my travels have expanded to Germany and I still travel 
somewhat regularly to Russia and throughout Ukraine checking on projects.  I’d still like to see 
more of the world, which is something I’ve always dreamed of doing, but the opportunity finally 
came about during this era.” 
~~~Roman. 
 
 “During the late 1990’s, I was finishing my university studies.  While completing my 
fifth year, my Master’s degree, I was also teaching English to the first year university students.  
Throughout the academic year, I graded my students on their academic ability and how they 
retained the information presented in class and in their homework.  When year-end finals were 
around the corner, some of my students (especially those who really had to work hard to earn a 
passing grade), would start bringing me homemade tortes, cakes, desserts or other gifts.  They 
hoped the sweet treat would sweeten me to award them with good grades.  This is something that 
worked in years past for their parents when they were at university.  I always appreciated the 
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gesture, but also really tried not to let it influence me as I was administering their final exams 
and grading them.” 
~~~Mykola. 
 
 “I work with university students.  My office is based in Kyiv, which I opened in 2000.  
The fact that I was able to open my own business is something that would have been a greater 
challenge some 20 years before – mainly because my business is a recruitment agency.  We 
recruit university students for a work and travel program to gain work experience in the United 
States.  We also run an Au Pair service for university students to nanny abroad.  The fact that our 
people have such an opportunity today is also a dream come true, as travel, back during the 
Soviet era was accessible only within the states of the Soviet Union. 
 Many students view this program as a dream come true for their desire to travel and see 
the world.  When submitting their applications, many not only express interest in gaining work 
experience and advancing their English, but also their desire to have the opportunity to travel 
abroad and to see firsthand what life is like in the U.S. 
 Several of the students think or perceive that everyone in the U.S. lives a glamorous 
lifestyle as seen on American TV shows broadcast in Ukraine.  They think everyday life for all is 
similar as seen on “Friends” or “Beverly Hills 90210.”  They are fascinated by the life and 
culture that exists in America and want that for themselves as well. 
 When the work and travel program’s popularity began in Ukraine back in the early 
2000’s, students were able to stay and work in the U.S. for a full four months and as late into 
October.  However, university classes begin September 1
st
.  These students received an exception 
as they were participating in the program but the stipulation remained they would need to return 
home to Ukraine to continue their studies.” 
~~~Danylo. 
 
 “Again, I’ve never had any interest or desire for politics.  I’ve always tried to avoid the 
topic, yet it emerges within my hobby.  Under Kuchma, postage stamps were issued 
commemorating Ukraine’s infrastructure of trains, sports, popular flowers, national holidays and 
national poets.  In the early 2000’s a sense of nationalism and patriotism began to be displayed in 
the stamps.  A series of stamps depicting traditional regional clothing, women’s headdresses, 
swords, pysanky (Ukrainian Easter Eggs), churches and scenes of prominent tourist spots in 
42 
 
major regional cities were depicted.  Special stamps honoring national artists (for example, poets 
Ivan Franko and Taras Shevchenko) were also issued and contained brief biographies.  I suppose 
it was a way to further instill national and cultural pride after independence.  In all of these 
stamps color came alive – bright, vibrant, detailed colors stood out on the stamps.” 
~~~Taras. 
 
 “During Kuchma’s second term in office, I remember the students’ demonstrations 
“Ukraine Without Kuchma” … I read a lot of periodic literary works about Stalin’s repressions, 
Ukrainian history…  Kuchma’s politics were bureaucracy and directed for self-survival.  
Therefore, I would not call it democratic.  However, in all actuality, political repression did not 
exist…  There was anti-regime movement.  Even government workers openly discussed with 
colleagues these events without fear of repercussions.” 
~~~ Petro. 
 
The 2004 Presidential Elections 
 As confirmed by my participants, to further develop the state during the early years of 
independence, expectations within Ukraine under Kuchma’s command were high.  This came 
about as nationalistic pride continued to be promoted.  The promised changes and anticipated 
results to follow were not coming about.  Instead, only cosmetic changes came and were used to 
mask the stagnation of policies.  Therefore, the desire for change in policies and procedures of 
democratic nature still had not been attained at the end of Kuchma’s presidency.  Many felt that 
the presidential election of 2004 would serve as an opportunity to allow a turning point to 
become a reality.  To make this happen, people needed to participate in the elections. 
 
 “Towards the end of Kuchma’s time in office, my impressions were elevated and they 
were expectations of what remained to be completed.  I remember heated discussions with 
colleagues and friends if they were supporting Yushchenko or Yanukovych. – Everyone’s 
stances were quite strong either way.  People were even able to pat each other on the back or 
fight with one another, even if they knew each other for years…  Despite this, people were not 
afraid to express their opinions supporting Yushchenko even in Luhansk. 
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 Did I vote during the elections?  Yes, of course I voted…  Particularly, I remember how 
strongly it was stressed the need to vote…  We waited for some kind of provocation…  There 
was the potential of revenge in the future.” 
~~~Petro. 
 
 “At first I thought that some of the oligarchs wanted to outlive the others.  Not without 
great costs of being sponsors, Kuchma’s propaganda worked well.  They herded up students for 
meetings supporting the Party of Regions and Yanukovych. 
 I participated in the elections by voting.  I voted during all three rounds.  I always feel 
that need to participate in an election by voting, and you need to choose someone to support.” 
~~~Volodya. 
 
 “Changes were wanted, not just desired.  The belief was that the elections would be a 
way to help change life for the better.  I participated in the election.  In other elections I also 
participate.  The tradition for us is this – participate in the elections.” 
~~~Maksym. 
 
 “I most definitely participated in the election by voting.  My younger sister also voted.  
When the protests began after the first round of the election, she desperately wanted to travel to 
Kyiv.  I would not allow her to go alone, not knowing what could happen en route or upon 
arrival.  Though I wanted to travel to Kyiv myself, I knew that was potentially very unsafe due to 
probable provocations that could come about.  To make sure she did not travel during this time, 
we hid her ID, so she could not make travel arrangements.” 
~~~Mykola. 
 
 “In Lviv, we knew this was the time and great opportunity for change to occur.  I 
participated by voting.  Some of my friends traveled to Kyiv, though.” 
~~~Bohdan. 
 
 “In Ternopil, at the time of the election and its purpose was simple.  The election was one 
to determine who would be president – Yushchenko or Yanukovych – Kuchma’s chosen person 
was to continue the ways of corruption.  Yushchenko and Tymoshenko expressed what the 
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people wanted to hear and expressed the changes that they as political figures and the general 
public wanted to see in Ukraine.” 
~~~Sophia. 
 
 “During the campaign, my friends and I often talked about the upcoming elections what 
we saw and experienced within Lviv and Ternopil.  All of us were in the middle of our university 
studies.  Several of my friends at other universities and their classmates were being bullied to 
vote a certain way (in favor of Yanukovych).  They were told if they did not vote for 
Yanukovych, they would be evicted from student dormitories, face academic probations, or even 
expulsion.  To add to the threat of expulsion, authorities told students they would not be able to 
transfer to another university in Ukraine after being expelled.  Almost all of the universities in 
Ukraine are run by the state; so, the fear of making these threats a reality was very possible. 
 Even professors and school teachers in smaller cities and villages were bullied like this 
too.  The threat they received if they did not vote “correctly” was to face unemployment.  
Another friend of mine, who is a nurse at a small clinic, also was bullied into voting for 
Yanukovych.  Her punishment, like the school teachers, would be losing her job.  Personally, I 
tried to be very careful during this time.  I focused hard on my studies and tried to keep to myself 
and not get into serious discussions with anyone that somebody else might hear.” 
~~~Maryna. 
 
 “During the 2004 elections, Yushchenko campaign billboards in and around Pidhajtsi 
were vandalized at night.  Sometimes they were vandalized in broad daylight.  They were openly 
destroyed even with guards protecting the boards after the act became quite regular.  The pro-
Yushchenko boards were replaced with posters expressing support for Yanukovych.  Campaign 
posters for both candidates decorated tall fences, buildings and such, wherever there was space, 
making it look like wallpaper.  You could see the mix of Yanukovych posters overlapping and 
trying to cover Yushchenko posters.  You would not dare take down the Yanukovych posters 
once they were up.  They were all closely monitored, surveyed and protected by the authorities.  
This was not just in Pidhajtsi or in the Ternopil oblast, where Yushchenko was incredibly 
popular, but it happened throughout Western Ukraine.  Western Ukraine heavily supported 





 “I believe the pre-election expectations were for changes for the better.  Part of the 
population put their expectations in support of Yushchenko and part in Yanukovych.  
Unfortunately, the majority of the population believes in the promises the politicians make, and 
pay little attention to what they have done.  That was before the elections. 
 When the election started, a lot of people were angered by the way the election was 
handled.  Many infractions and falsifications were allowed by the authorities because they tried 
to push Yanukovych into the presidency.  The hopes and expectations, coupled with the anger 
for the falsifications during voting, the trust in the politicians who promised better life in case of 
Yushchenko’s victory, caused the people to invade Maidan in Kyiv – the demonstration. 
 My personal impression before the election was virtually unemotional.  I did not believe 
any of the promises made by Yanukovych, nor Yushchenko, or his supporter – Yulia 
Tymoshenko.  I knew that these people did not care much for Ukraine and perhaps did not even 
understand the meaning of the presidency and the responsibility that goes with it.  I was leaning 
to support Yushchenko only because he represented smaller and less influential oligarchs.  
Furthermore, Yanukovych, we knew, in his youth was involved in criminal activities according 
to court records.  Yushchenko, on the other hand, had a clean record.  I would not care to look 
for a national patriot amongst all the politicians.  I did participate in the elections, as I always 
went voting in the past.  This is only because I feel it’s my duty.” 
~~~Viktor. 
 
The Orange Revolution 
 Many citizens understood the value and need to participate in the elections by voting as 
indicated by my participants’ experiences.  Also, was the need to respond to Yushchenko’s call 
to action, requesting that everyone who could, come on to Maidan Nezalezhnosti.  Many, who 
could travel to Kyiv, did.  Some traveled with ease and others with great difficulty, as authorities 
were directed to send travelers from other cities back to their hometowns. 
 
 “I was in Western Ukraine at the time of the 2004 elections.  I was near Ternopil.  We all 
saw and realized what was going on in the larger cities with the election.  About three or four 
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days after the second round of voting, I decided to go to Kyiv.  I took the local shuttle bus 40km 
from Berezhany to Ternopil without any difficulty. 
 In Ternopil, I decided to take the bus to Lviv and once there, purchase a train ticket to 
Kyiv.  This was more cost-efficient and the schedule was more flexible than trying to take the 
train from Ternopil to Kyiv.  As soon as I arrived to the train station in Lviv, the ticket agent 
informed me that all train tickets to Kyiv were sold out.  The ticket agent also said that there 
would not be any more trains traveling to Kyiv.  I was not going to let this stop me.  I wanted to 
be part of this event.  I wanted to be part of history.  I knew all of this would be part of a great 
story I would tell not only my children, but also my grandchildren, some day. 
 I went back to the bus station and bought a ticket.  Going to Kyiv by bus would, of 
course, take longer than train, which I was ok with as I knew I had no other real viable option.  
Shortly after we were on the road, somewhere just outside of Lviv, the authorities had blocked 
the road.  A couple of police officers got on the bus and informed us that the bus had to be turned 
around.  They were not allowing any travel to Kyiv whatsoever.  The bus was full of passengers.  
We were all shocked, disgusted and angered by what had happened.” 
~~~Vasyl. 
 
 “I was studying at the university when the elections took place.  It was the end of 
November and I had exams I needed to prepare for, so I decided to stay in Lviv.  My friends, 
however, decided to go to Kyiv.  Within about a day, they quickly organized themselves to travel 
in groups to Kyiv.  Once there, they planned to take turns standing out in the cold on Maidan.  
This way, not everyone would stand outside in the cold at the same time and get exhausted and 
not withstand the cold elements for excessive amounts of time.  They could also alternate their 
time and travel between Kyiv and Lviv, while still taking care of everyday matters at home.  I 
helped my friends to take care of things while they were away; including visiting their homes as 
someone would when watching a house while you are away on vacation.  My friends all came 
back with their impressions of the atmosphere on Maidan. 
 They also told me about the challenges they faced while traveling between Lviv and 
Kyiv.  It was interesting that whenever the group who was in Kyiv and ready to go back after a 
couple days, they had minimal problems traveling.  They had the most issues when they first 
attempted to go to Kyiv.  I think their returning to Lviv during the protests actually helped them.  
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They made the authorities think for just a moment that the best thing would be was to return 
home and continue with everyday life activities.  They made it look like they were not actively 
participating in the protests.” 
~~~Bohdan. 
 
 “During the Orange Revolution, I was in the Czech Republic on business.  Abroad and 
especially in the U.S.A., these events are viewed from a romantic perspective.  Ukrainians see it 
differently.  My friends from Western Ukraine expressed doubts during the Orange Revolution 
and disappointments thereafter. 
 During the revolution the public was awakened.  Some had expectations, some had fear 
of worrying and some just tried to guess what will come out of all this.  In general, there was 
uplift – people felt they could challenge the authorities.  This can be good and it can be bad.  It 
all depends on what direction that energy is aimed at.” 
~~~Viktor. 
 
 “I was concerned during this time.  I was very nervous about telling others who I voted 
for, who I supported during the campaign and who’s platform would best benefit me as a citizen.  
My hesitation to talk about who I voted for came from the provocations and bullying my friends 
experienced at their universities.  It wasn’t until several days into the Orange Revolution that I 
started opening up and telling people that I in fact voted for Yushchenko.  Still, I was extremely 
cautious to share this information with my peers, even those who also supported Yushchenko.” 
~~~Maryna. 
 
 “Some of my friends traveled to Maidan to participate in the protest.  I called them from 
time to time for updates.  During this time, I was in Ternopil on a previously arranged trip.  I 
watched the happenings on Maidan on TV.” 
~~~Petro. 
 
 “I vividly remember Maidan!  Living in Kyiv, I knew I had to go and participate.  I met a 
lot of people, some from Kyiv and others who traveled great distances to participate.  Some of 
the conversations I had with others were quite open, in depth and others; just simply wanted to 
be a part of the event, kept their conversations with me very brief.  From the people I spoke with, 
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many from Western and Central Ukraine, seemed organized with their travel groups – they were 
well prepared to face the winter weather with many warm clothes and blankets, food and phone 
chargers.  Whenever anyone had a chance to walk through the underground shopping area under 
Maidan, you would see outlets overflowing with mobile phones charging up and some people 
were also using their laptops.  The ones from Eastern Ukraine seemed to be less organized and 
ill-prepared, with just the clothes on their backs. 
 Standing among the crowds, I started talking with a couple of young guys from Eastern 
Ukraine who were from Dnipropetrovs’k.  I asked why they came and how was it that they 
seemed to have virtually nothing with them.  One quickly answered that they were sent to 
Maidan just to see what exactly was going on.  They were strong Yanukovych supporters, and 
the local Yanukovych campaign office sent them to Kyiv to counter-protest.  They were simply 
overwhelmed and mesmerized by the events and what they were seeing.  They quickly realized 
there was no way they could complete the job assigned to them.  The young men confided in me 
that they too wanted to be a part of the event, but they were unsure of their real role.  The young 
men told me that just before stepping on to Maidan they threw away pro-Yanukovych, anti-
Yushchenko signs they brought into the trash.  They wanted to be a part of the events on Maidan 
in a positive way, not to fight for the continuation of what existed until that point. 
 I offered them what I could – warm food, a chance to stop into my apartment to warm up 
and freshen up, call their families.  The gentlemen said they received an outpouring of support 
from local Kyivans and those who came prepared to stay outside for long periods of time.  
People shared their blankets, gave them cups of hot tea and soups.  They told me they were 
overwhelmed by the warm reception from so many; as when they arrived, they anticipated that 
everyone would express animosity towards them as they were originally sent to fight against the 
intent of what was happening on Maidan. 
 See, the protests on Maidan were a way to unite us.  They reminded us that we are all 
human and we were in this together.” 
~~~Roman. 
 
Technology and The Orange Revolution 
 During the Orange Revolution, regardless of my participants’ locations, all relied on 
technology for communication.  The most reliable form of technology was telephone – both cell 
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phone and land line.  Those who had and used cell phones often checked in with others via 
SMS/text messages.  Internet communications via ICQ and emails were quite popular with all 
participants.  Everyone who said they utilized these media found it a positive way to document 
their immediate feelings and the events in their surroundings.  None of my participants really 
mentioned anything regarding blogs – if they read other blogs or if they personally blogged 
during this time.  They all accessed news websites to get the most up to date information on the 
happenings around them and throughout Ukraine.  Many watched the events on TV. 
 
 “I remember the excitement being broadcast on TV from Maidan.  That was the central 
place for all activity.  All I watched on TV during that time were the events and activities on 
Maidan in Kyiv.” 
~~~Maksym. 
 
 “Politics have never seriously interested me.  I did not travel to Kyiv.  It was interesting 
to observe the events on TV and radio, however.” 
~~~Volodya. 
 
 “The most important moment was the fact that the government did not order any 
shooting, and did not put the tanks on the streets, that it did not start a war.” 
~~~Viktor. 
 
Outcomes and Results 
 Viktor noted directly the fear and concern that bloodshed would occur.  The fear of 
internal war potentially starting within the state was a strong concern with the high stress and 
tension surrounding the discourse of the announced outcome of the election.  Many of my 
interview participants alluded to this point.  However, they never came out directly to recall this 
concern.  In addition to asking my participants about where they were at the time of the election, 
how they participated, what modes of communication they utilized, I also asked them what they 
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most vividly recalled from this time.  Some said the particular events they personally 
experienced; and others, the conversations they had with virtual strangers.  No one referenced the 
musical entertainment on Maidan that continued throughout the movement.  I also asked what 
the most ideal outcome would be.  For Viktor, the most positive outcome was the fact that 
bloodshed did not occur.  Hopeful outcomes greatly varied for others who shared their 
experiences. 
 
 “My impressions and feelings were not very happy, nor optimistic about any good results 
after these elections.  Within my family and friends, some were cautious to take any position in 
the elections.  Some felt sorry for this or the other candidate.  I did not hear anyone expressing 
any trust for either candidate.  The biggest dissatisfactions were the falsifications.  The people 
would not accept that.  It was taken as theft of their rights.  In my opinion, that was the basis of 
this so called “Orange Revolution.”  To call what happened a revolution is an over assumption.  
Was it manifestation of public consciousness? – Yes!  Even though, later that too, was 
squandered away. 
 There were not many great expectations.  Of course the desire for economic stability, 
reduction in corruption (or hopefully, total elimination), hope for more stable and better laws – 




 “The hope was for growth and opportunities not just for Ukraine, but for the people.  
Hope existed for European integration, and EU membership.  The eventual result from these 
things would be more opportunities for people to travel abroad and not just travel abroad to find 
work, but more for leisure, business purposes and such exchanges.  Many still want to travel 
abroad, mainly for the purpose to find employment.  Several of my friends will go to the Polish 
Consulate in Lviv and wait in line for a full day in hopes to obtain a work visa.  They know there 





 “A couple things went through my mind during this time while going through the events 
of the Orange Revolution.  Truly, I remember very well the broadcasts from Maidan on Radio 
Era, TV Channel 5.  The feeling of joy during the announcement of the re-vote’s results of 
Yushchenko’s victory….  Unimaginable hatred and fear in the eyes of some leaders who so 
strongly supported Yanukovych.  Ultimately, my hope during this time was the creation of a true, 
righteous, real Ukrainian lawful state and with equal partnership with Europe while stepping 
away from Russia.  Measurable improvement in the economy – for instance to do like the Czech 
Republic, and the Baltics – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, was also expected.” 
~~~Petro. 
 
 “I hoped for less fear of needing others in order to accomplish something for myself and 
needing to repay the person or people who expected a favor in return.  Really, I wanted to feel 
more like one large team, working together.  All citizens and government officials working 
toward a common goal to fully better Ukraine is what I envisioned would happen.  A sense of 
that was noticeable during the Orange Revolution even with the tense moments.” 
~~~Maryna. 
 
 “I hoped for European integration, quality of life to be improved for people, finally, 
renewal of authority.” 
~~~Volodya. 
 
 “It’s simple – improvement of life, reforms, democratic elections.” 
~~~Maksym. 
 
 “I hoped the result of the elections would improve my life and the lives of my family and 
close friends.  I hoped for all of us to have more opportunities and to a certain extent, an easier 
life, with fewer daily struggles.” 
~~~Mykola. 
 
 “I hoped the results would lead to a much happier life for everyone.  While walking on 
the streets of Lviv, or any other city in Ukraine, you rarely, if ever, see people smile.  Their eyes 
are lifeless.  People’s eyes sparkle when hope and possibility are present.  You do not see or feel 
this in Lviv.  I never have felt this here.  I see it with Americans when they visit, their eyes 
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sparkle, even when they are not smiling.  You can actually see the hope, possibility and 
positivity of wonder that is around them.” 
~~~Bohdan. 
 
 “I was hopeful for more opportunities for personal growth.  That is, I was looking 
forward to the grand possibilities of experiencing life abroad.  I expected that it would be easier 
to travel to and from Ukraine.  Fortunately, I had this opportunity; to travel abroad.  Though, I 
am not sure if this opportunity was an actual result of the Orange Revolution, as some travel was 
possible before the election and the Revolution.” 
~~~Sophia. 
 
 “Personally, I was very hopeful that the ultimate result of the Orange Revolution would 
be quite positive.  I was very optimistic that it would greatly benefit my company and allow 
citizens a better chance to travel abroad and experience life overseas.  I also hoped that many 
would take their experiences and apply them to our own economy and workforce.  The potential 
is there to really improve our employment systems here with this new knowledge.  The desire for 
seeing the world who watched us was high.  Some of my students said they found the Orange 
Revolution to be a personal eye opener as they learned that people around the world were 
following the events.” 
~~~Danylo. 
 
 “Many people were hoping for a better life.  Everyone was under the auspicious of 




Expectations After the Orange Revolution 
 Collectively, these were the hopes and sentiments my participants – as well as their 
families, friends and colleagues – experienced during the Orange Revolution.  All participants 
said there was a sense of calm that emerged after the Orange Revolution, especially since there 
was also concern that a potentially highly stressful time could possibly erupt into an 
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uncontrollable situation.  It was after Yushchenko took office that reality set in.  This was the 
time for the reforms that were promised were to be executed.  Yet, the promised changes were 
not seen or being noticed.  This general observation made by the public as well as scholars and 
analysts.  With the observed changes, expectations also changed. 
 
 “Changes were realized when the real reforms didn’t have the strength or power to be 
implemented to make them a reality when the president forfeited his authority when he realized 
there would be no illusions and the same leaders remained in their positions.  The illusions of 
patriotic governing and growth (uplifting of nationally oriented economy), instead was present.” 
~~~Petro. 
 
 “We expected and felt a breath of fresh air.  The chance to go back to a democratic way 
within life and policies to be restored was present.  It sounded like the changes would go into 




 “Gradually, things were, or became clear, that the new leadership that came in was no 
less corrupt than the oligarchs, but were poorer.  Some of the new leaders were in utopia, far 
from reality.  It was like this until Yanukovych became prime minister.” 
~~~Volodya. 
 
 “I anxiously waited for the promised changes to occur.  I was hopeful for several months.  
I would wake up in the morning and think to myself, ‘Today will be the day.  We will see 
changes – something will be announced in the news.’  It did not happen.  I started to question my 
own sanity for my anxiousness at the time of the Orange Revolution.  Did I really make that 
sacrifice to travel?  Did it help in the long run of my daily life?  I was part of the initial event to 





 “Changes came about when those who won the election did not fulfill their promises.  
They became friends with those who the public voted against.  All that was desired by many was 
the return to democracy.” 
~~~Maksym. 
 
 “I would say that after the Revolution, many people were disappointed.  Actually, 
nothing had changed at all.  The fighting in the government, economic instability, closing of 
many banks, due to bankruptcy, and people’s losses of savings created a new vicious cycle.  The 
conflicts between the president and the prime minister, the president and the parliament, the 
attempt of the president to butt into the judicial system, ignoring of campaign promises, no 
enforcement of law, the growth in the size of the government, and again the corruption, which 
everyone is fighting.” 
~~~Viktor. 
 
 “Personally, my life has not changed much, that is, the quality of life.  I’ve always lived 
fairly simply, like many in and around Pidhajtsi.  Parts of the smaller villages surrounding my 
small town still have limited electricity, just as they did 30 years ago.  Some residents don’t even 
have telephones in their homes or the phone lines do not reach their areas of the villages still 
today.  In general, I expected that some of these things would have improved by now, knowing 
that technology is around us and we all rely on it to a certain extent daily.  At the very least, I 
expected that there would be consistent electricity throughout the neighboring villages by today. 
 There are also many very large and potentially dangerous potholes in the streets and 
roads.  The potholes are always ignored, never repaired, and continue to grow with each season 
and changes in the weather, like anywhere else.  Some of the potholes are as big as the road is 
wide and they get worse each year.  The infrastructure just is not executed locally (that is within 
the Ternopil Oblast) to give us the attention we need.  Other things are more important.” 
~~~Nadia. 
 
 “A sense of nationalism and patriotism emerged in the postage stamps about the time of 
the Orange Revolution and the first few months after.  Stamps commemorating the Orange 





Were There Any Changes in Life After the Orange Revolution? 
 After the Orange Revolution, all of my participants had expectations of what life would 
be like under the new administration.  In addition to sharing their expectations, my participants 
also discussed if and how their lives have changed since the Orange Revolution. 
 
 “Presently, life has worsened.  In comparison to the U.S. Dollar, you earn two times less 
for the same job, because the price of goods and services has increased greatly.  I do not feel that 
the politics are nationally oriented.  Mostly, the greater demographic of “grabbers” (leadership) 
do not indicate any signs of improvement or potential for changes.  The opposition is 
demoralized.  People are tired of the politics.  They do not believe the politicians.  Besides that, 
economic bad news, and huge price increases for communal services and products are greatly 
worsening the situation.” 
~~~Petro. 
 




 “Right now, life has worsened.  This is because now educators are earning very low 
wages and they have not increased in quite some time.  Communal expenses and cost of food 
(overall cost of living) has increased and it appears it will continue to increase.  Anything you 
need to ask for, anything you need resolution for, you need to pay bribes.  There is no law 
against it.  It seems that the laws are in existence not for the protection of anyone, but to have the 
ability to accuse the innocent, or punish the innocent and protect the guilty (all for the sake of 
bribes). 
 Since the Orange Revolution, my life has barely changed.  In certain areas, it is 
impossible to make any moves that will provide resolution.  City rulers are leading by the old 





 “In my opinion, the events on Maidan in 2004 were not exactly a revolution.  A 
revolution is a change in socio-political and economic order that occurred in 1991.  In 2004, one 
group of oligarchs took control and pushed the other one aside.  In fact, after these events, 
nothing changed.  The only item of interest was to follow the infighting in the “Orange Camp” 
and the efforts of the opposition to out argue and out shout those in power.  Now the situation in 
Ukraine truly has changed.  It changed, but not for the better. 
 The events of 2004, which you call a revolution, did not affect a change in my life or 
lives of most people.  The changes occurred after that in 2010 and even moreso in 2011.” 
~~~Viktor. 
 
 “My life has not changed as a result of the election’s outcome.  Things remain the same.  
Within a year of the Orange Revolution, I needed minor surgery which still required anesthesia.  
My doctor referred me to a surgeon for the procedure.  The surgeon told me he could perform the 
necessary surgery as long as I paid him upfront.  The payment was to guarantee that the correct 
procedure would be done and completed properly.  My upfront payment did not cover any sort of 
legitimate medical costs like the time for the surgery, necessary tools and so forth. 
 In addition to paying the surgeon, I also had to pay the anesthesiologist well in advance 
of the surgery.  This payment was to ensure he administered the proper dosage of anesthesia so 
as for me not feel the pain, but also for him not to kill me.  The bribes I had to pay before the 
surgery did not stop there.  I also had to pay the pharmacist to fill the prescription for antibiotics 
and any pain medications my surgeon prescribed.  The payment was to ensure that the proper 
doses were given to me as set by my doctor.  The additional costs about doubled the actual 
necessary cost of the procedure.  I had no choice but to pay the bribes to have the surgery and 
have it done correctly.” 
~~~Bohdan. 
 
 “I’m still extremely cautious in my everyday life.  I confide in my closest friends my 
opinions, especially relating to politics.  Telling the wrong person the right thing can get you in 





 “My life, as I said before, really has not changed much at all during these years and 
especially after the Orange Revolution.  A couple years ago, a cousin of ours made plans to come 
to Ukraine for a visit for a family event in the village.  My relative brought a suitcase on the 
plane, but it never made it to the baggage claim area in Lviv.  The airport authorities promised to 
track down the luggage and call us once it arrived.  We checked in with the airport for couple of 
days and got the same response that the bag was still lost. 
 A friend of a friend of my family’s knew one of the guards at the Lviv airport who 
relayed the story of the missing suitcase.  The guard confirmed the bag in fact made it off the 
plane with my cousin.  The friend and guard made an agreement and arranged to return the bag.  
The arrangement included a bunch of pages of jokes printed from the internet, a bottle of cognac 
and a box of chocolates. 
 On our way back to the village, my relative told me of the interrogation regarding the 
bag’s contents.  The interrogation was conducted while signing the paperwork for collecting the 
suitcase.  The bag was returned with a wire wrapped around it, through the zipper and soldered 
shut.  The bag was searched for any possible items of value or importance.” 
~~~Nadia. 
 
 “A colleague of mine was crossing the street in Kyiv.  He was jay-walking and the police 
officers caught him.  The policemen were going to issue the man a ticket, fining him for the 
offense which was about $5 U.S. Dollars.  However, they started negotiating with my colleague.  
They told him if he gave them $10 – double the charge of the ticket, they would not write or 
issue the ticket let alone document the happening.” 
~~~Roman. 
 
 “Those changes I wanted to see and rushed to Kyiv and Maidan to show my support 
during the Orange Revolution did not happen.  My life has not improved.  At best, it remains the 
same – this is my optimism speaking.  To be negative, life has worsened because changes have 
not occurred to improve the overall quality of life for all.  Politics remains the same.” 
~~~Vasyl. 
 
 “Things have not changed a whole lot.  One thing I have noticed is that you hear a little 
more Ukrainian spoken on the streets of Kyiv.  You do not hear it very often and you have to 
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listen very carefully.  It is still a hybrid-mix of Ukrainian and Russian.  If you start speaking to 
someone in Ukrainian in Kyiv, some will be more inclined today than they were ten years ago to 
respond to you in Ukrainian.  I’ve noticed this whenever I would come to Kyiv to visit my sister 
and compared this to my earlier travels before she was at university.” 
~~~Sophia. 
 
 “The program that I run really is a very good experience for our university-aged students.  
They are able to gain great work experience, practice English and see a part of the world.  I think 
the work experience is the greatest benefit to the students.  This is something they would not 
have a chance to obtain at the same level if they applied for an entry-level job here in Ukraine.  
The economy just is not strong enough for them at this level.  This is a challenge that has not yet 
been met.  My students also have acknowledged this when they express interest in participating 
in the program.  In turn, they can apply their new skills to a job here when seeking employment.  
Working abroad is very attractive to employers here. 
 In preparation for their visa interviews, my students also meet with me to assess their 
language skills, determine if the student is not only qualified, but is sincerely interested in 
participating in the program.  The students applying to the program for the first time, I get a very 
good feeling about their intentions.  It is the students who want to participate for a second or 
third time on the program who concern me. 
 The students participating in the program for the first time are concerned to abide by the 
set rules and ramifications.  These guidelines are established by the consulate to ensure students 
return home in time for their university classes.  The “first time” students also tend to follow the 
rules closely, as they understand that any faulty steps they take could jeopardize the possibility of 
obtaining a visa to the U.S. in the future. 
 I mentioned before the students who return to participate in the program raise concern for 
me.  Primarily, my concern is that they will challenge the rules and regulations by not returning 
home once they completed their programs.  A lot of this is because these returning students have 
already been to the U.S. and feel comfortable traveling abroad.  They already know and have a 
strong understanding of the procedures to participate.  Plus, these students already have 
connections and networks in the U.S. as a result of their previous trip.  Some of the students 
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maintain these new connections along with ties to old friends and distant relatives so they can 
stay “a couple extra weeks before coming home.” 
 The most concerning students are the ones who completed their fourth year of university 
studies, the equivalent of their Bachelor’s degree.  I’ve seen many students who, after 
completing their fourth year of university not return home.  I call the students’ family when I 
learn they have not come back.  Often, the parents do not seem concerned that their child has not 
returned home.  The rule is that the students must return home in a reasonable timeframe for their 
university studies.  The students all see opportunity available to them to work in America, and 
they also see the challenges and slow development of life improvement here in Ukraine. 
 One of the ways I’ve seen the program change since the Orange Revolution is the length 
of the visa for our students.  A couple years before the Orange Revolution, around 2003-2004, 
Ukrainian students could participate on their work programs in America until October.  
University classes begin September 1
st
.  Many students saw this program as a luxury and never 
returned home.  The freedom was abused and the consulate started requiring all Ukrainian 
students to return home in time for their university classes.  The expected return date continues 
to push earlier into August each year.  Four years ago, in 2007, students had to return home by 
September 2
nd
.  In 2008, students had to return by August 31
st
.  Last year, in 2010, they had to 
return by August 28
th
. 
 It is in these ways I see what has changed in Ukraine.  Traveling abroad has been less 
restrictive than it was 25 years ago.  My company has had a great chance to grow because of the 
greater freedom for international travel.” 
~~~Danylo. 
 
 “Personally, my life has not changed.  However, I have noticed that my hobby and 
passion has.  Fewer stamps have been issued in the last couple of years.  They are less ornate and 
much less nationalistic.  They lack the cultural pride which influenced the stamps’ previous 
designs just a few years ago.  The stamps are more industrial.  They focus on military ships and 
the most popular train lines in Ukraine.  I asked someone at the post office about their 
observations about the stamps after noticing this change.  They blamed the change in motifs due 
to the economy and the cost of printing such stamps was an unnecessary expense, where funds 





 “Yanukovych and his supporters recently capitalized on this lack of improvement in life.  
When he ran against Yushchenko in the presidential election a couple years ago, many of his key 
supporters canvassing for him hit the small villages in Western Ukraine quite hard.  They saw 
these people going through hardships and many lacked funds to take care of everyday matters.  
They literally capitalized on this.  Yanukovych’s supporters talked with these people and offered 
them bribes if they voted for Yanukovych.  They offered some people as much as 3,000-5,000 
hryvnia.  For some, this is massive amounts of money.  They promised that with Yanukovych as 
president, life would be grand and wonderful.  They painted a beautiful image of the life they 
could have if Yanukovych was elected president.  Many villagers accepted this bribe as they 
needed the cash.” 
~~~Mychajlo. 
 
Patriotism and Nationalism 
 From my participants’ feedback one can deduce that life has not changed immensely 
since the Orange Revolution.  If anything, the quality of life is about the same it was the 
movement, or slightly worse.  They’ve acknowledged slight changes in daily life on a grander 
scale.  However, they have not experienced many differences which immediately and directly 
affect their lives.  My participants’ responses led me to ask about their patriotism and at what 
point did they feel most patriotic or nationalistic in their lives. 
 
 “I believe I am more patriotic now than I was ever before.  Even with that strong of a 
conviction, I would not be defending it as energetically.  In places, the world has a lot of grey, 
because the world is not just black and white.” 
~~~Petro. 
 
 “My patriotism started in the 1980’s.  It continues today.  It remains at the same level 









 “Hearing Ukraine’s national anthem play on Maidan during the Orange Revolution was 
when I felt most patriotic.  It was played and sung daily on Maidan.  This reiterated my 
patriotism.  It was truly reinforced and moved me greatly – to the point of tears.  This was 
particularly moving after the third round of voting.  To acknowledge Yushchenko’s election and 
those standing out on Maidan supporting him, the anthem was played yet again.  I never felt 
more Ukrainian in my life or knew what it meant to be Ukrainian until that moment.” 
~~~Roman. 
 
 “I think I am as patriotic as I was before.  My nationalistic pride really came out during 
the Orange Revolution.  Yushchenko and Tymoshenko stood for the things I believed in, wanted 
and hoped for.  They took their positions, expressed what many of us wanted – democracy, 
openness, and development.” 
~~~Mykola. 
 
 “My nationalism or patriotism never really existed.  I consider all of this part of politics.” 
~~~Taras. 
 
 “During the last ten years, I’ve proudly displayed a Ukrainian flag on the wall in my 
home.  Many of my friends do the same.  Some just display their Ukrainian flag at the time of 
“patriotic” holidays.  They will display their flag to celebrate Independence Day of 1991 and also 
from 1918.  They may also pull out their flag in November when honoring and remembering the 
millions who perished during the Holodmor.  I prefer to keep my Ukrainian flag displayed all 
year long.  It reminds me who I am and where I live.” 
~~~Bohdan. 
 
 “I have always been patriotic.  My attitude to my Fatherland fortunately was not affected 
by the reconstruction (Perestroika), Kuchma, Yushchenko with Tymoshenko, Yanukovych, or 
the Orange Revolution.  I am Ukrainian, grew up in Ukraine, my grandparents and great-
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grandparents lived here.  I know the history of my country, the culture and the language.  I love 
Ukraine dearly and I strive to do what is the best for the people.” 
~~~Viktor. 
 
 “I would say I’m still very patriotic.  My patriotism really started in 1991.  During 
Kuchma’s time as president, my patriotism subsided, especially during the Gongadze scandal.  I 
questioned the legitimacy of the news reports.  This made me question my own nationalistic 
pride.  It wasn’t until Yushchenko started campaigning and traveling throughout Ukraine that my 
patriotism returned with new energy, passion and excitement.  I think it subsided again during 
the Yushchenko administration when changes were not happening.  My own patriotism really 
declined at the same rate that Yushchenko’s popularity did during his presidency.” 
~~~Vasyl. 
 
 “During the Orange Revolution was when I felt most patriotic.  I was at university and 
once the Orange Revolution started and it felt “ok” to express my nationalism more than the 
months before, I did it.  The expression was liberating.” 
~~~Maryna. 
 
 “My most nationalistic moment was voting in the election during all three rounds.  The 
results of the third round put a huge smile on my face.  I felt like I helped, I did my part to 
support Yushchenko in a way I could.  In the third round, my vote actually meant something!  I 
felt my patriotism within me was quite strong then and hope came for me that my patriotism 
would grow with Ukraine.” 
~~~Sophia. 
 
In the Future… 
 In conclusion, after learning about the level of nationalism and patriotism my participants 
expressed, I had to ask a question about the future.  I asked, if a future event resembling the 
Orange Revolution, or an event calling on the public’s participation, were to occur again, would 




 “In public encounters – no.  I cannot do this publically because of my current position 
and status within society.  However, in fact, in voting and referendums and other opportunities of 
expression of my faith, I would participate in such an event again – absolutely.” 
~~~Petro. 
 
 “I would be more inclined to participate in a greater fashion.  I think that many others 
would also participate.” 
~~~Volodya. 
 
 “No.  I no longer believe in politicians or revolutions.” 
~~~Maksym. 
 
 “Definitely.  Despite the challenges I faced during my travels to Kyiv, I would do it all 
again.  Instead of going alone, I would bring a group of people with me on such an adventure.  
This strength in numbers would also further challenge the authorities along the way.” 
~~~Vasyl. 
 
 “Absolutely!  If I needed to open my home to others, as I extended last time, I would do 
it in an instant.  I love meeting new people, learning from them and discussing our viewpoints.  
This is what makes all of us stronger – more united as citizens.” 
~~~Roman. 
 
 “I’m not sure.  If I knew my life would not be affected because I would support one or 
the other person, maybe.  That is, I would not risk losing my job, my home, not face any charges 
because of my viewpoint and how I see things.” 
~~~Maryna. 
 
 “Should something similar were to occur, I would have to see.  If again, someone was 
counting on the patriotic convictions of the public, tried to secure himself a nice, warm position 
in the government, I will not participate in that.  However, if on the scene appeared people who 
truly will care for Ukraine and the people, for the culture and sovereignty; then, yes, I will work 





 “I can see myself participating in the future.  I’m not sure in what capacity.  At the very 
least, I would vote, express my opinion, be vocal.  At this point in my life, spending numerous 
hours outside in street protests would be very stressful and take a serious toll on my health.” 
~~~Nadia. 
 
 “If I were to participate, I might want to do more than just vote.  It all depends on where I 
am in my life, and what happened to instigate the protest.” 
~~~Sophia. 
 
 “I would participate in an event like this again.  It was an exciting, yet stressful and nerve 
wracking time.  As we all went through this once, I think it would be different a second time 
around.  We’ve gone through all of it once.  I can see myself taking on a leadership or 





ANALYSIS OF ORAL HISTORIES 
 All together, through my participants’ personal experiences, it is evident that over the 
course of the last 30 to 40 years, life in Ukraine has changed overall.  Changes to a democratic 
system from socialism and the way government functioned have affected Ukraine on a grander 
level.  Despite the changes, people’s lives have not been revolutionized.  One of my participants 
left me with some closing thoughts: 
 “Do not think of me as a pessimist, but rather a realist.  I believe that Ukraine and the 
Ukrainian people will not get lost in the dust of history.  For thousands of years, people in our 
land developed great culture, built beautiful palaces, grew bread and wrote songs.  Attempts for 
many ages to destroy these people attained no success.  We survived and will continue to 
survive.  The current events – they are ‘growth of illness,’ therefore; we should forgive our 
leaders, because they know not what they are doing.” 
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 With the changes observed by my participants and their personal experiences, it is 
evident to see how the 2004 election and the Orange Revolution played out for them.  Their 
observations and recollections help reinforce the fact that the Orange Revolution was a post-
socialist urban political movement.  They painted the picture of life during Soviet times, the 
initial excitement of independence and the pangs and challenges that followed.  My participants’ 
experiences during the Orange Revolution and their feelings before and after, compliment the 
definition of urban social movements.  These firsthand accounts provide additional depth to this 
topic while further describing the circumstances of this time.  The participants’ experiences 
expand the criteria of post-socialist urban political movements by providing specific examples. 
 
 
The 2004 Presidential Elections 
 One very common point of view among my participants was the personal value and 
importance they felt when casting their vote.  All stressed this basic act of participation.  Also 
commonly, my participants shared what the election meant in their eyes, the expectations, 
concerns and anxiety that followed, the bullying that occurred, as well as the sense of division. 
 
 
 Meaning of the Election 
 With the common sentiment that participation in the election by voting was important, 
the election held meaning to citizens.  Several participants stated they hoped the election would 
bring about great things, especially the possibility for changes.  Maksym strongly felt this way.  
Both Volodya and Sophia felt the election was an opportunity for one of two possible options to 
emerge.  They felt there was potential for the better of two evils to be elected.  It would either by 
the oligarchs led by Kuchma who would stay in command and things within Ukraine would 
remain unchanged; or the possibility for change could come with Yushchenko’s election.  Viktor 
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also noticed this, but was pessimistic about the end result.  Sophia saw hope within the elections.  
She noted Yushchenko and Tymoshenko spoke directly to the citizens, focusing on the issues 
that were important to them.  Nadia observed strong support for Yushchenko in Pidhajtsi. 
 
 
 Anxiety, Concern and Expectations 
 Within the election, expectations were set.  Anxiety and concern followed, if the 
expectations were not met.  Petro felt the election was an opportune time to finish the expected 
changes that were not yet complete.  His concerns stemmed from possible provocations.  Petro 
felt the need to be on guard.  Like Petro, Mykola was also concerned about possible 
provocations. 
 Sophia was concerned about the possibility of corruption continuing after the election.  
Nadia noticed the vandalism of billboards which were monitored after Yanukovych posters came 
up.  A sense of uncertainty was indirect once authorities protected campaign signs. 
 Maryna was very concerned during the time before and during the elections.  She was 
nearly fearful.  Her own anxiety emerged while cautiously confiding in others about the pending 
elections.  Maksym blatantly acknowledged that changes were needed, not only desired.  Bohdan 




 In addition to the anxiety and concern people felt, bulling was a tactic that enhanced these 
feelings.  Viktor said the bullying furthered after the fear was instilled in citizens.  Nadia noticed 
the bullying by means of destroying pro-Yushchenko billboards and replacing them with pro-
Yanukovych posters.  The authorities then monitored the signs to prevent further destruction.  
Maryna provided the greatest details of the bullying that existed which she and her friends 
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experienced.  She noted the posed consequences and how they potentially could change a 




 With the election pending, the possibility for division came about.  Petro talked about 
heated discussions he had with his friends and colleagues.  Some conversations were quite 
intense.  Viktor also felt impending divisions based on people’s preferences for who would be 
elected.  Nadia felt the divisions through the billboards’ destruction, replacement and protection.  




 In discussing the Orange Revolution, my participants described issues surrounding 
transportation, weather conditions, secrets and confidentiality, anxiety and concern, as well as 





 From the testimonies, people traveled to Kyiv from all over Ukraine.  A few of my 
participants had friends who traveled from their small town or city to Kyiv.  Petro was in 
Ternopil on a trip and had friends who went to Kyiv.  Bohdan’s friends organized themselves to 
travel several times to Kyiv from Lviv.  He recalled their first trip was challenging.  However, as 
they kept returning to Lviv, traveling during the movement became easier as they returned home 
and left only for brief times. 
 Roman, who lives in Kyiv, was able to travel with much ease compared to others.  He 
had the opportunity to learn about the travels of the people he met on Maidan.  Vasyl had the 
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most difficulty traveling to Kyiv.  Locally, from Berezhany, (a smaller town), to Ternopil, he 
traveled with ease.  His travels by bus from Ternopil to Lviv were also effortless.  Both cities are 
well populated.  His difficulties began in Lviv on his way to Kyiv, where the hub of activity was 
growing.  By the time he arrived to the train station, authorities stopped allowing the trains to 




 The Orange Revolution started at the end of November.  Winter already set in with snow 
and cold temperatures in Kyiv.  The winter elements had to be considered by all who were going 
to be outside standing on Independence Square.  People responding to Yushchenko’s call to 
action to come to Maidan, needed to prepare for winter weather.  Bohdan’s friends who traveled 
in groups to Kyiv strategized to stand on Maidan in shifts taking breaks while maintaining their 
presence.  This was their way to stay energized while standing up to the announced election 
results.  Their plan also helped maintain a constant presence of people on Independence Square. 
 Roman shared his observations of groups of people who traveled to Kyiv and how they 
prepared to withstand the elements.  He also keenly observed that people from Central and 
Western Ukraine were well prepared to brave the weather for longer periods of time.  He noticed 
their preparations indicated intent to stay and follow through on Yushchenko’s request.  On the 
other hand, Roman noticed that people from Eastern Ukraine were less prepared for the winter 
conditions.  He described how people went underground on Maidan and warmed up in the 
shopping area.  He also discussed how local Kyivans, himself included, helped those from other 
cities stay warm during the movement.  He opened his home to protestors to warm up, freshen up 




 Secrets and Confidentiality 
 With the unity felt on Maidan while battling the cold temperatures, secrecy and 
confidentiality still existed.  Viktor’s friends cautiously expressed their doubts during the Orange 
Revolution.  Vasyl indirectly experienced the withholding of information during his travels.  The 
bus to Kyiv from Lviv was sent back to Lviv by the authorities.  The police simply told the 
passengers that the road was closed. 
 In turn, Bohdan’s friends expressed their own secrecy towards the authorities by 
returning regularly to Lviv during the movement.  His friends spent a few days at home before 
returning to Kyiv to further participate in the movement.  Maryna was more open in sharing her 
sentiment of confidentiality and secrets she held during the Orange Revolution.  She maintained 
a very cautious approach to any possible conversations about the movement and her opinions 
surrounding the topic. 
 
 Anxiety and Concern 
 Maryna’s feelings of secrecy tie in with the anxiety and concern she felt.  She was 
cautious and hesitant to share her viewpoint with others.  Viktor’s friends also expressed their 
concerns for what could happen next in Ukraine.  Vasyl’s anxiety came through when traveling 
to Kyiv and encountered obstacles.  He was determined to travel regardless of the challenges.  
Roman shared the anxiety felt by the two young men from Dnipropetrovs’k who defected upon 
arriving to Kyiv.  They were unsure how they would be received, especially as they were initially 
sent to Independence Square for a different purpose. 
 
 Sharing and Teamwork 
 Examples of sharing and teamwork were profound with my participants.  This 
emphasizes a sense of unity coming from civil society.  Viktor noticed this sentiment from a 
general view.  He observed the people together were empowered to demand change. 
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 Bohdan, who did not travel to Kyiv with his friends, stayed in Lviv.  He assisted his 
friends when they were in Kyiv by house sitting and helping manage everyday activities.  
Bohdan’s friends traveling back and forth to Kyiv also worked together on Maidan by taking 
turns standing out in the cold. 
 Roman also saw teamwork and sharing on Maidan.  He helped others by opening his 
house, talking with new friends and sharing experiences during the movement.  He saw people 
while warming up in the shopping area under Maidan, took turns charging cell phones in the 
outlets.  He also learned of teamwork and sharing when fellow protestors embraced the 
Yanukovych defectors.  He detailed the outpouring of support and a sense of welcome they 
received along with warm clothes and food. 
 
 Maidan Nezalezhnosti’s Representation 
 Maidan Nezalezhnosti was the main location for the Orange Revolution.  People 
congregated here, responding to Yushchenko’s request.  It was the central hub for the movement.  
My participants who traveled to partake in the Orange Revolution protests, desired this place as 
their final destination.  For Vasyl, it was the place to be to experience the event.  He wanted to be 
part of the movement and witness it firsthand.  Ultimately, he wanted “to be part of history.”  
Bohdan and Petro associated Maidan with being the central location of the movement.  They 
experienced the protests through their friends’ primary participation.  Roman found Maidan to be 
the common ground to unite citizens participating in the movement.  It was the place where they 
all took a stand on the election and raised a collective voice. 
 
 
Outcomes and Results 
 After the Orange Revolution, much was hoped for and expected.  Commonly, feelings of 
optimism, pessimism and caution followed.  Additional hopes for globalization, Westernization, 
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travel opportunities and the release of Soviet-style practices were expressed and desired.  All of 




 Almost everyone who shared their experiences with me expressed optimism for growth, 
development and advancement of the state after the election.  They hoped for lawfulness to be 
instilled and corruption to decrease.  Sophia was optimistic for state growth and development.  
She was also hopeful for improvements citizens could experience.  Petro and Viktor’s optimism 
aligned with Sophia’s.  Bohdan and Mykola hoped for more happiness and a better quality of 
life.  Danylo was optimistic his company would grow.  He hoped for more opportunities 
overseas and travels outside of Ukraine for the people he recruits. 
 
 
 Pessimism and Caution 
 During the election, some of Viktor’s friends were cautious about taking a stance for a 
particular candidate.  He was disappointed about the falsified election results.  Sophia’s friends 
grew pessimistic after the Orange Revolution to secure solid employment within Ukraine.  
Bohdan shared his observation of the lack of hope he sees in others’ eyes. 
 
 
 Globalization, Westernization and Travel 
 Globalization, striving towards Westernization and enhancing relations with Europe were 
common themes also desired by my participants.  Sophia’s friends began seeking employment 
outside of Ukraine and applied for work visas.  This was their solution to get the results they 
desired to improve their economic and employment opportunities.  Danylo commented how the 
work abroad students concern him by staying in the United States and not returning home to 
complete their university studies.  They see this program as an opportunity to escape and leave 
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Ukraine.  Volodya commented how some businesses are being proactive in attempting to meet 
European standards.  Petro also expected great improvement within Ukraine’s economy.  This 
would help strengthen European relations and then further other possible opportunities. 
 
 
 Release of Soviet-Style Practices 
 Another commonly desired outcome was to step away from Soviet practices.  Petro noted 
along with striving towards an equal partnership with Europe, Ukraine would need to step away 
from Russia.  Maryna hoped to be able to escape the patron-client relation system.  Instead of 
feeling indebted to someone and needing to pay them back, she wanted more of a “pay it 
forward” system.  She sought out a way to see how everyone could contribute to the greater 
good.  Maksym simply wanted to see reforms and democratic elections. 
 
Post-Orange Revolution Expectations 
 Along with the outcomes and results immediately following the Orange Revolution, my 
participants had subsequent expectations.  The major common expectation after the movement 
was the promised changes verbalized during the election. Primarily, these promised changes 
surrounded government reforms, a shift in priorities within the state and its development.  There 
was hope and optimism for follow through on the promises made.  There was also a sense of 
dejection or disappointment.  Finally, there was the realization that changes were not happening. 
 
 
 Positive Hope 
 Vasyl and Bohdan both shared their anticipation for seeing changes become realized.  
Both looked forward to a more democratic system.  They expected changes to occur essentially 
overnight.  Taras noted in postage stamps a sense of celebration in the commemorative stamps 
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 Dejection, Disappointment 
 With each passing day during the Yushchenko administration, Bohdan and Vasyl started 
feeling dejected as changes were not seen or being made.  Petro felt patriotism and the 
government’s role and activities were merely an illusion.  Volodya felt there was no real change 
in leadership, and corruption still existed.  Viktor also noticed the disappointment felt by many 
people around him.  He noted that negative changes occurred, and resulted from infighting 
among government members. 
 
 
 Lack of Change 
 Many said changes never happened.  Maksym and Viktor said the main change was how 
government members interacted with each other.  Both said new friends were made among 
government members and new fights started.  Nadia felt the lack of urgency while anticipating 





 Hearing my participants’ personal experiences adds a human element to understanding 
the Orange Revolution’s role as a post-socialist urban political movement.  It also adds deeper 
insight in comprehending how such an event is absorbed by the people who partake in it.  
Understanding the impact of this event from the perspective of the state’s citizens further 
compliments the basis for executing such movements. 
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 Post-socialist urban political movements emerge within a state where desired and 
expected changes occur very gradually.  The public hardly notices these changes.  Frustration 
with the observed lack of change is present among the public.  This creates discourse which 
results in protest demanding change.  Authority figures and the general population are involved 
as the movement is executed.  A charismatic leader encourages participation from citizens who 
desire greater good in return.  To pressure the changes wanted, the protest ensues.  The demand 
for changing the norm within the system is a way to revive the stagnated transition to a 
democratic state.  Such is the case for Ukraine.  As this time can be volatile, diverse feelings 
from people involved emerge. 
 Many of these sentiments were expressed by my participants through their shared 
recollections and observations.  They discussed their memories of life under the Soviet system, 
the moments surrounding independence in 1991, the transition that followed and seemed to drag 
on in their eyes and stagnate.  They shared their hopes, desires and growing frustration during the 
Kuchma administration when they saw the democratic development they desired and expected 
stall.  The public was then led by a charismatic leader, Yushchenko and alongside him, 
Tymoshenko.  They wanted to see change.  By means of the 2004 presidential election, the 
public seized the opportunity to demand change and return to a more democratic system as 
originally promised and planned by the state’s leaders. 
The Orange Revolution, through the leadership, was an opportunity for the citizens to 
unite.  They took a stand together, expressing their demands for changes and eliminate the 
corruption they saw within Ukraine.  The people were able to raise a common voice on 
Independence Square.  The movement they embodied was one that held the opportunity to 
demand initiation of the changes already expected. 
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 One big factor considered by the groups supporting Yushchenko and helping to organize 
the protest was the weather and season during this event.  It was the first part of winter when the 
Orange Revolution began.  Weather, with cold temperatures, snow and wind could have been 
great deterrents for people not to go to Kyiv, let alone stand outside for long periods of time.  
Instead, people united because of the weather and worked together.  They shared warm layers of 
clothes and blankets, warm food and some Kyivans shared their homes.  This instilled a grander 
sense of community and unity within the protesters. 
 During the movement, an array of feelings came about.  Feelings of fear are commonly 
expected surrounding such an event.  Maryna was fearful before and during the Orange 
Revolution.  Her fears surfaced out of her daily life.  Fear can also come through the possibility 
of the demanded changes not occurring.  In essence, an anticipated disappointment can be felt.  
These feelings were expressed by several of my participants after the Orange Revolution.  Vasyl 
felt his effort to travel to Kyiv was possibly done in vain.  At the time of the movement, he 
wanted to be a part of this event.  When he set forth on his journey to Kyiv, his feeling was of 
great excitement for the opportunity for change.  He was also hopeful during this time. 
 After the Orange Revolution, feelings that followed after some time were frustration, 
disappointment and dissatisfaction.  Many of my participants expressed their unhappiness with 
the lack of follow through after the movement.  Nadia said she anticipated further development 
within her town and the surrounding villages.  Bohdan expected to see the changes within 
government.  Instead, the change they experienced was the return to previous stagnation, and the 
continuation of corruption. 
 The feedback from my interview participants verifies that a movement had to occur in 
order to promote change within Ukraine.  The activities surrounding the 2004 presidential 
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election served as the catalyst which brewed the movement.  It was the result of the election that 
allowed the Orange Revolution to come about and amplify the desire for changes the citizens 
wanted to see.  My participants reconfirmed that the changes following independence were too 
gradual to be noticed.  Frustration followed this observation for the stagnation.  Citizens sought 
out a monumental way to push for the transition initiated previously.  Their outlet for this 
movement came about with the impending change of authority through the state leader. 
 The participant who left me with their concluding thoughts reaffirms the Orange 
Revolution was in fact a post-socialist urban political movement.  This participant’s final 
statement, “The current events – they are ‘growth of illness,’ therefore, we should forgive our 
leaders, because they know not what they are doing,” sums up many of the feelings and 
circumstances surrounding a movement.  The referenced “growth of illness” reaffirms the 
changes and developments that come with the transition from a socialist system to one that is 
more democratic.  The adversity that subsequently follows the initial change in the system was 
observed by this participant.  It is the initial growing pains of a young democratic state. 
 My participant also noted the state’s leaders need to be forgiven as “they do not know 
what they are doing.”  The state leaders know how to lead the state.  However, it is in what 
capacity, under what circumstances and the ramifications that exist under the newer democratic 
system which challenges their leadership.  All of the state leaders and politicians involved in the 
Orange Revolution were still familiar with socialist ways.  They, like the public with everyday 
happenings, are still learning how to eliminate old practices and remain within democratic 
solutions.  It is citizens who then push via protest to initiate change.  Therefore, the movement 
seeks an alternative to what is happening within the state and its stagnation.  Collectively, the 
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citizens express a sense of wanting out of the dormant ways of the state and return to growth and 
development. 
 On the other hand, Viktor disagreed that the Orange Revolution was a social movement.  
He felt the event was manifested by public consciousness.  Based on his statement, it appears he 
would agree that the Orange Revolution was simply a burst of pent up frustration.  This 
contradicts my hypothesis of this particular movement.  However, his comments reconfirm that 
he did not feel that the movement revolutionized his life or the lives of those around him.  This 









HYPOTHESIS REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT__________________________ 
 
REVIEW OF KUZIO’S HYPOTHESIS 
 The Orange Revolution’s intent was straightforward, even with the numerous complex 
factors existing just before its onset.  This assisted in shaping it into a politically charged post-
socialist urban movement.  Several of my research materials concluded that the Orange 
Revolution was several movements in one.  Arguments were presented that this movement was a 
technological revolution, a protest against corruption and cronyism, and a political protest 
surrounded by what is presumably the “longest rock concert in history” (Klid, 2007, 118).  All of 
these arguments defining the Orange Revolution accurately explain various aspects of the 
protest.  Ironically, the role of music and the ongoing “rock concert” was never addressed or 
acknowledged by my interview participants. 
 Technologically, the media usage of cell phones, text messaging, internet and email 
played an incredible role among the people participating.  Strong anti-corruption sentiments were 
felt by those who sought and demanded changes within the political system.  Ongoing 
entertainment between news updates on Independence Square aided to keep protestors’ spirits 
positive while listening to some of their favorite Ukrainian music groups.  However, not even the 
execution of the Orange Revolution could have been possible without the people from all facets 
of Ukrainian society within the state.  Without the people, the Orange Revolution would not have 
occurred.  Participation of people from all sectors of society must be reviewed.  This includes 
politicians from various political groups in the state, celebrities, athletes, musicians and citizens.  
 Ultimately, the Orange Revolution emerged surrounding the 2004 presidential election.  
Up to that point, the people’s frustration of what they saw and desired as an end result for the 
state reaffirmed the immediate political goals of increasing civil participation and government 
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transparency.  This aided in motivating the initiation of the movement.  The event was therefore, 
made possible by the election’s announced results. 
 Shortly after the Orange Revolution, scholar Taras Kuzio acknowledged that the event 
and the mass protests’ strength emerged from three separate sectors of Ukrainian society: civil 
society and opposition groups who organized the revolution, the narod (people) who provided 
the power behind the crowds, and the defectors from the party in command, who turned their 
backs on Kuchma (Kuzio, 2005, 29). 
 
KUZIO’S HYPOTHESIS 
Civil Society and Opposition Groups 
 Pora was the central cog for organizing and rallying people.  It was Yushchenko’s main 
support group who wanted democracy reinstalled in Ukraine.  The group worked in two parts 
while striving towards enforcing their goal.  One part of Pora focused on non-violent protest 
methods.  The second part of Pora’s efforts was directed at getting people involved to participate 
and take a stand in for what they believed.  Civil societies like clubs, institutions and NGO’s 
were non-existent two decades before. 
 Alongside Pora were Chysta Ukraina and Znayu!  Their missions coincided with Pora’s.  
All three wanted a clean, democratic presidential election.  Each wanted the system to continue 
transitioning from the socialist ways of 20 years before and further establish the newer 
democratic system.  All needed the support of manpower from society to exist.  Chysta Ukraina 
assisted Pora in recruiting people to take a stand publicly for a clean democracy and therefore, a 
“clean Ukraine” as depicted by their name.  Znayu! (translated as “I know!”), directed its efforts 
to target and inform the younger generation to vote.  They educated this demographic on the 
importance of voting and the impact their participation would have on the outcome. 
80 
 
 Yushchenko relied heavily on Pora and its supporting groups.  With their help, Pora 
became the project manager overseeing participation from the public while maintaining a non-
violent atmosphere.  Pora helped set the trend for all protestors to wear something orange.  
Anything orange that could be worn was fashionable, including armbands made from orange 
ribbons.  Pora’s colors, yellow and black, were also popular.  The two colors defined the two 
parts of Pora – the part focusing and promoting non-violent protests and the other encouraging 
participation by standing up for what they wanted. 
 Yushchenko also relied on his main political supporter, Tymoshenko for help.  As she 
canvassed on Yushchenko’s behalf, Tymoshenko simply persuaded citizens to vote.  She 
influenced them further, to vote for Yushchenko and support a democratic structure within the 
state.  This was fostered by Znayu through their education efforts urging citizens to vote.  To 
represent each of Ukraine’s 25 oblasts, 25 tents were pitched on Maidan, starting the tent city 
(Wilson, 2005a, 123).  As the revolution continued and more people arrived, the tent city grew.  
Over 1,500 tents were pitched and the makeshift city within Kyiv had a population of over 
15,000 (Åslund, eds., 2006, 96).  For seventeen days, the public endured the start of winter in 
Kyiv.  Pora and those in the tent city lived outside starting November 21, 2004 and remained 
there until Yushchenko’s inauguration on January 23, 2005.  Pora helped oversee the tent city 
remained organized, clean and alcohol free.  The tent city residents became the key people on 
Maidan.  Many floated back and forth between their tent home and Independence Square. 
 Together, these civil society groups, along with the support from Yushchenko’s political 
colleagues set the foundation and guidelines for the movement’s execution.  Together, during the 
Orange Revolution, they were able to publicly express their desire to end corruption, weaken ties 
with Russia and return to building democracy and strengthen relationships with the West.  All of 
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this further enhanced the drive and motivation for the Orange Revolution.  These factors added 
fuel to the movement and the election from which it originated. 
 Pora successfully drew people to sustain the Orange Revolution by their presence on 
Maidan.  First, the strong support from civic organizations and their cooperation.  Second, they 
all focused on the younger population – those in their 20’s and 30’s.  This demographic totaled 




 Many young voters of the 2004 election were children in 1991, born Soviet citizens.  
During their youth, their national identity and citizenship transitioned from Soviet to Ukrainian.  
Many of the youngest voters experienced a cultural identity crisis while growing up.  Like their 
parents, this younger generation experienced life under Soviet rule.  Together, they celebrated 
independence and the start of a new way of life.  Then, they experienced stagnation in the 
transition towards democracy and growth while realizing Ukraine’s potential of being a strong 
state.  Kuzio refers to this age group as “Generation Orange” (Kuzio, 2005, 39).  They saw, 
learned about and experienced democracy and freedom – rights unthinkable under Communism.  
They also began learning about life under a different ruling environment, which like them was 
young, and at times needed guidance. 
 Before the Orange Revolution, many of Ukraine’s younger citizens, eligible to vote were 
apathetic and neutral towards politics.  The previous generation of Ukraine’s youngest voters 
was proactive just before the fall of the Soviet curtain.  Shortly before independence, the youth 
observed and expressed nationalism by speaking in Ukrainian more regularly.  They also 
expressed themselves through pop culture, especially via music.  The trend of music appeared 
again during the Orange Revolution. 
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 Helping the narod be more openly expressive and participate were celebrities not 
involved in politics.  Athletes, solo musicians and music groups became visual and audio 
supporters for the candidates.  Boxing champion brothers, Wladimir and Vitaly Klitschko 
supported Yushchenko.  Soccer star, Andri Shevchenko supported Yanukovych.  Shevchenko’s 
decision to support Yanukovych and encouragement of others to also do so was ill-taken by his 
fans.  Many of his fans protested outwardly during soccer games, including in Donetsk. 
 Musicians and pop-stars supporting the candidates had the opportunity to express their 
preference and participate in the campaigns.  They participated at various rallies by performing.  
This has become common practice in Ukraine to further garner voter support (Klid, 2007, 119).  
This activity becomes a win-win situation for both musicians and candidates.  Musicians cannot 
always afford to incur expenses for concert tours in Ukraine.  This gives the musicians the 
opportunity to perform and increase their popularity.  Candidates then, get additional public 
support from the musicians’ fan base.  Additionally, the narod wins by having the opportunity to 
support their preferred candidate and enjoy musical entertainment. 
 Music helped unite the younger generation non-evasively which encouraged their 
participation by voting and standing on Maidan.  During the election campaign, some pop stars 
outwardly expressed their political opinions.  Singers Mariia Burmaka, Taras Chubai and Oleh 
Skrypka signed an open letter declaring their concern Ukraine would become a “Third World 
dictatorship” (Klid, 2007, 123).  Many singers openly expressed the importance of the 2004 
elections and their concerns for Ukraine if corruption and crony capitalism continued to exist. 
 During the campaign, musicians became a sounding board for the candidates.  Their own 
political desires were expressed while endorsing the candidates through moral support.  Having 
musicians perform during the Orange Revolution made the event sort of a “political Woodstock.”  
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“In total, 22 singers and groups performed in support of Yushchenko, and 38 performed for 
Yanukovych’s events” (Klid, 2007, 119).  Many musicians who performed on Maidan during the 
Orange Revolution, are still associated with the event based on their performances.  Several of 
the groups’ songs are canonized in this movement, based on their lyrics.  These songs expressed 
in poetic form the narod’s feelings.  
 Many of the song lyrics sung by music groups, supporting Yushchenko, expressed the 
narod’s feelings and sentiments.  The lyrics became the voice for the citizens to articulate their 
opinions and desires.  Okean El’zy performed often and regularly on Maidan.  Many of their 
song lyrics resonated with citizens and urged them to participate and vote.  Greenjolly, a band 
from Ivano-Frankivsk wrote a rap song that became the anthem of the Orange Revolution.  The 
lyrics were clear and direct, stating the public’s disenchantment with the government and 
leadership.  It further empowered citizens reiterating they are not alone; and together they will 
not back down.  Between the music, their artists, cultural icons and leadership of Pora, the narod 
was guided to unite.  The music also aided in drawing people to Maidan and stay there.  It 
entertained them, which in turn helped to maintain an upbeat atmosphere. 
 As younger citizens were familiar with these pop-culture icons, they turned to them for 
inspiration to express their personal preferences for political leadership.  Today’s youth looked 
up to these figures much like the younger generation of Ukrainians in the 1890’s who turned to 
Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Mazepa, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and King Danylo for their aspirations 
toward democratic ideologies (Klid, 2004, 270).  Oleh Skrypka from the music group Plach 
Ieremii decided to publicly support Yushchenko on the basis “that the time had arrived to take a 
strong civic position” (Klid, 2007, 122).  Singers supporting Yushchenko encouraged the 
students attending their rallies not to let Yanukovych’s camp intimidate them into voting a 
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particular way.  Bullying tactics by university professors and administrators included threats of 




 The third group from society that contributed to the masses of the Orange Revolution is 
the defectors from Kuchma, Yanukovych and the oligarchs.  With the Orange Revolution’s 
onset, both political figures and cultural icons supporting Yanukovych and Kuchma’s central 
group absconded to support Yushchenko instead.  One defector Kuzio acknowledged is Yevhen 
Marchuk.  He served as defense minister until the summer of 2004.  Other defectors include 
celebrities and stars who did not immediately verbalize their support for either candidate.  Their 
neutralism until the last minute – closer to the election – can be considered defecting from 
Yanukovych, as he was counting on their vote and support.  Some, like Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, 
for example, did not reveal for whom they would vote.  Their silence and initial announcement 
of remaining neutral before supporting Yushchenko at the last minute defines these people as 
defectors. 
 Vakarchuk, the lead singer of Okean El’zy, one of Ukraine’s top bands, remained 
apolitical during most of the campaign.  As a musician, he felt he should not participate directly 
in the election or express his political preferences.  He believed everyone should participate in 
the election and understand the importance of participating.  In October 2004, he stated,  
“I do not want to go to the political barricades – I am being pushed there by life and my 
conscience…  Today, all of us have to speak out.  This is our civic duty.  Because when 
you are asked, for instance, ‘Does Ukraine need to be independent?’, you cannot answer, 
‘Don’t bug me – that’s politics.’  It is understood that these elections will decide the 
future of the country.”(Klid, 2007, 122). 
   
Closer to the election, Vakarchuk expressed his support for Yushchenko.  However, he did not 
endorse Yushchenko.  Vakarchuk was named and accepted the position of adviser to 
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Yushchenko on youth policies (Klid, 2007, 124).  Showing direct support by participating in 
campaigning for Yushchenko earlier in the election could have sensationalized the event. 
 During the campaign, Yanukovych asked pop star singer and Eurovision 2004 winner, 
Ruslana Lyzhychko to serve as the Minister of Culture, a position she declined.  Before the 
election, Lyzhychko remained neutral and did not express her support for either candidate until 
the last minute – November 17, 2004 (Klid, 2007, 122).  She then declared her support for 
Yushchenko.  At the Orange Revolution’s start, Lyzhychko went on hunger strike, protesting the 
election’s results.  She ate only bread and drank tea. 
 In both instances, Vakarchuk and Lyzhychko, abstained from supporting either candidate 
until closer to the election on November 21.  As they appeared to be undecided for so long, their 
sudden act to support Yushchenko can be viewed as defecting from Yanukovych.  This can be 
inferred from Lyzhychko declining Yanukovych’s offering of a government job.  The Orange 
Revolution’s motivation contributed to the defectors’ support for Yushchenko.  Pop-culture 
figures and other politicians also defected from their parties to side with Yushchenko.  This 
helped unite Yushchenko supporters and strengthened the movement. 
 
KUZIO’S ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
 Kuzio stated the Orange Revolution emerged from three sectors of society.  His argument 
factors and accounts for a great majority of what constitutes a social movement.  His societal 
groupings capture the movement’s overall, general civil contribution.  His major sectors are civil 
society and opposition groups, the narod and defectors.  Kuzio displays a very basic definition 
for each group.  He keeps the narod broadly defined, simply acknowledging the people who 
supported Yushchenko and those who stood on Maidan.  How the people are categorized within 
society is not addressed or discussed.  The participants in the event played a key role.  Kuzio 
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acknowledges this and the civil society groups – mainly Pora, who drew the narod to 
Independence Square and participate in the movement.  His broad definitions aid to maintain a 
general, theoretical understanding of the peoples’ role. 
 The three distinct groups Kuzio points out coincide with Roberta Garner’s argument that 
a social movement constitutes the people’s collective desire to challenge and change society 
within the state.  Together, they can seize the moment to initiate change.  This is the fundamental 
purpose of a social movement.  Additionally, his argument that the participants are a necessity 
and determining factor for the movement’s occurrence aligns with Garner’s.  Kuzio also 
acknowledges that discourse regarding Ukraine’s continued development was present within the 
state.  However, not everything that captures or embodies a social movement is included in 
Kuzio’s argument. 
 A major contributing factor to any social movement is missing from Kuzio’s argument.  
In discussing the three groups of society, Kuzio excludes one particular person.  This person is 
not categorized by these groups, though they are the central focus for the participants.  Garner 
acknowledges this vital figure within the activity of social movements.  Kuzio’s argument lacks 
acknowledgement of a charismatic leader.  His definition of the emergence of the Orange 
Revolution completely excludes Yushchenko, the voice of the collected people. 
 Furthermore, Yushchenko was not alone with charisma during the movement.  
Tymoshenko added her charisma by encouraging participation of others.  Without this 
leadership, or their energy, the social movement would not have been as strong as it was or 
emerged in the way it had.  Their promotion of participation greatly influences and aids the role 
of the civil society.  The leadership adds to the focus and drive of the movement, making it 
streamlined and not chaotic like a riot.  They set the tone for the movement.  The leader 
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expresses the voice and preferences of the collective population during such an event.  Kuzio 
merely blends the leadership into the movement. 
 The fact that Kuzio does not include the role of a charismatic leader challenges social 
movement theory.  The leader of the movement holds power over the people participating in the 
event.  It is because of the leader and their call to action that the participants actually participate, 
responding to the request.  The leader not only speaks for the people on a higher level and 
represents them; this person also guides the movement’s participants on how to proceed, act or 
even react during the event. 
 During this particular social movement, Yushchenko along with Tymoshenko led the 
public on Maidan to remain active and stay put until the falsified election results were 
overturned.  They stressed the importance of remaining non-violent throughout the protest 
despite high tensions.  Had it not been for the mentorship of the leaders, the Orange Revolut ion 
may not have been the social movement it became.  The expectation and tone they set was 
further extended through the civil society who set this precedence for the narod. 
 Kuzio’s argument supports social movement theory.  His theory factors a great majority 
of what constitutes a movement – the key groups within the state’s society.  However, it cannot 
fully define the theory as it focuses primarily on the key groups of people involved and their 
participation.  If the groups of the society do not participate or express interest in making 
changes, the masses needed for such a sizeable event will not come about to sustain the 
movement.  Without the acknowledged discourse experienced by the public, the desire for 
change and a charismatic leader; a social movement may have difficulty emerging.  Ultimately, 
Kuzio’s argument only assesses the general public and its categories. 
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 The public and the groups of society are not the only ones that embody a movement.  He 
keeps a centric focus on the majority of the people who want changes to emerge within the state.  
The three key groups are essential in understanding the people and what initially motivated them 
to participate.  Leadership and the pretense of the social movement are not addressed.  The 
reasoning for the social movement is not captured in Kuzio’s argument.  Unless one understands 
the Orange Revolution’s motives, Kuzio’s definition may be difficult to fully assess, as it details 
one major component for why it occurred and how it was a social movement. 
 
MY RESEARCH COMPARED TO KUZIO’S ARGUMENT 
 Kuzio’s argument focusing on who comprised the Orange Revolution categorized 
participants in three main groups.  Ultimately, the largest group consisted of the narod.  My 
interview participants fall under the narod category.  They voted in the election for their 
preferred candidate.  Some did not openly disclose for whom they voted; however, they alluded 
to whom they supported.  Almost all of my participants expressed their desire for change to 
occur both prior to and as a result of the Orange Revolution.  Regardless of their preference, they 
were captivated and motivated to vote and participate due to the leadership’s displayed charisma 
and energy.  All acknowledged that discourse existed within Ukraine before the election. 
 Many of my participants expressed their desire for change under the Kuchma 
administration.  Some changes were desired for the government systems and others in their 
personal lives, affected by the developing discourse.  They felt that if changes would occur to 
positively impact their lives, the discourse would diminish further growth within the state.  Many 
of my participants not only felt a sense of obligation to participate in the movement; but also felt 
their participation would pressure changes to occur.  Their motivation and captivation to take 
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part in the movement was further ignited by Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and others who 
expressed the value, need and potential future benefit to be part of the Orange Revolution. 
 Through my research, I learned about a group of defectors from Donetsk sent to Maidan 
to counter protest.  Upon arrival in Kyiv, they defected from Yanukovych and joined the 
movement.  Their act of defecting added them to Kuzio’s third group of people.  Had they not 
defected upon arrival and decided to continue supporting Yanukovych, they would not be 
accounted for in Kuzio’s statement.  I feel my research coincides and compliments Kuzio’s 
theory.  My findings expand his determination of how the movement emerged within society.  
Additionally, my new research displayed how the narod participated and worked together during 
the movement.  These firsthand accounts add a solid dimension to Kuzio’s argument and 
compliment it with a true human element. 
 Yushchenko’s role as the leader of the movement emphasizes that the Orange Revolution 
was the result of a falsified election vote.  His declaration of a call to action, which the public 
responded to, caused the eruption of the movement.  Several of my participants mentioned the 
political promises made during the election and the Orange Revolution.  These statements further 
encouraged their participation, as they anticipated the reward, or appreciation of their support to 
be the changes voiced, come to life. 
 Many of my participants shared their reasoning for voting during the election and taking 
their stance publically.  Many concluded their motivation for participating resulted in their desire 
for change within Ukraine.  They felt it was an opportunity to clearly express their opinions of 
what was occurring and the desired result in exchange.  Many were captivated by Yushchenko’s 
political platform and what he wanted to change once he became president.  As Yushchenko 
stood for many of the ideals that aligned with those of my participants, they were further 
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motivated to partake in the movement.  Their involvement showed their support for Yushchenko.  
The movement was their way to counteract the announced falsified vote.  As so many people 
constituting the narod came out to Independence Square to strengthen the Orange Revolution, 









 After reviewing post-socialist urban political movements, specifically, Ukraine’s Orange 
Revolution, we can observe and better understand how such events are initiated and executed.  
Their intent is also better understood.  These movements consistently seek change within their 
state.  In order for change to emerge, the movement then occurs.  Though the premise behind 
these movements remains the same, they way the event comes about varies.  The desire for 
change to occur is expressed by the people of the state.  Therefore, post-socialist urban political 
movements serve as the catalyst for change to erupt. 
 This thesis reviewed urban social movements, and focused on Ukraine’s Orange 
Revolution of 2004 as its case study.  In this project, such movements were the focal point of 
understanding how urban political movements come about within a state’s society.  In order for 
the Orange Revolution to qualify as a post-socialist urban political movement, a set of criteria 
had to be met.  First, socialism was once the norm in Ukraine under the Soviet Union.  However, 
when Ukraine declared its independence, a new governmental system was brought in and 
implemented.  The transition that followed for a more democratic system stagnated during its 
development.  Uncertainty and unfamiliarity with the new structure’s ramifications were 
challenged by the previous socialist practices. 
 The public saw the stagnation but was unsure how to enact change to impact the newer 
system.  Their frustration and tension built, pushing for the desired changes to be implemented 
and practiced.  Despite these feelings, nothing changed within the state.  Then, at a pivotal 
moment, a charismatic leader comes onto the scene and becomes the voice of the people.  This 
person leads the public in expressing their desired changes.  At this turning point, people voice 
what they want to see occur in the state.  Ultimately, for the movement to be effective and 
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successful, it must first be well organized, with purpose and emerge in response to one key 
event. 
 Looking at Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, this post-socialist urban political movement is 
defined as a pro-democracy protest.  After declaring independence from the Soviet Union, the 
government agreed to focus on establishing a democratic system after 70 years of communism.  
The new system involving democratic methods had a difficult time developing under Kuchma.  
Democratic initiatives slowed, as oligarchic activity and corruption increased.  Yushchenko, 
along with the public saw this stagnation.  With his previous political involvement and prior 
attempts to return Ukraine toward democratic growth, he used the political situation as a 
presidential candidate to his benefit.  Yushchenko then became the face of democracy and hope 
of a more secure democratic system for Ukraine’s citizens.  By doing so, Yushchenko 
established himself as the Orange Revolution’s charismatic leader. 
 Protesting the skewed outcome of the presidential election was a way to express 
dissatisfaction with the outgoing regime.  Previous protests declaring the citizens’ frustrations 
occurred, but quickly fizzled due to their lack of support.  The minimal size was enough for 
Kuchma and government to ignore complaints, or threaten the demonstrators with arrest.  The 
Orange Revolution, however held consequences that were unanticipated by Kuchma and his 
administration.  The cumulative and indirect effects among others mediated by the overall 
environment, both socially and physically, did not fit the casual structure of previous protests 
(Tilly, 2002, 9).  Ironically, this contributed to the strength of the movement. 
 The blending of communist and anti-communist members within parliament, although 
fair for expressing the voices of all parties created diffusion.  This stalled overall growth.  Under 
Kuchma’s administration, a sense of uncertainty emerged as stagnation and Europeanization 
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were replaced by privatization and corruption.  Essentially, this broke down a system which 
needed repair.  During Kuchma’s presidency, the government began working more for itself 
opposed for the people.  This sentiment then, gave way to a sense of uncertainty citizens felt.  
Additionally, media censorship emerged, further aiding in uncertain sentiments of the public.  
Ultimately, these feelings encouraged the motivation for change to occur from within, thereby 
allowing the opportunity for the post-socialist urban political movement to occur. 
 Yushchenko, as a charismatic leader, successfully rallied the people to support him both 
electorally, and to push for reform within the government to make its work more open. 
Reminders of encouragement emerged to eliminate corruption and aim towards Europeanization 
with eventual goals of ascension into global organizations.  The high corruption that existed in 
government before and upon Yushchenko’s inauguration, also affected the condition of the state, 
making it more disastrous than previously believed.  Additionally, Yushchenko’s strong 
campaign push to rectify government into a properly democratic functioning unit, and the 
realities of all this as part of daily life vanished.  Essentially, “the leader interprets “reality” for 
his followers in a way that makes them susceptible to mistaken perceptions of society that lead to 
the end rather than the success of the movement” (Garner, 1996, 27). 
 The Orange Revolution was successful in terms of a social movement.  It succeeded in 
gathering the public to stand up for elections free of manipulation.  The event pressured the 
existing government not to execute their pre-planned celebratory events and start acknowledging 
Yanukovych was elected by forced means of bribery, vote manipulations and bullying.  This 
resulted in an overthrow of the government, allowing Yushchenko to officially take office. 
 One noteworthy point within the specific discussion of Ukraine and its politics revolves 
around the state’s politicians.  All of Ukraine’s politicians, regardless of their political party 
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affiliation, are still under the same training, based in communism.  All still have close 
connections, relations and understandings with communistic manners for addressing state 
concerns and potential improvement.  This is not a fault, instead, it is what they experienced 
during their childhoods and their initial training received upon entering politics.  The approaches 
they learned are continuing through rote, even as they attempt to change their old ways. 
 Yushchenko acknowledged during his campaign that the 2004 presidential election was a 
time for change within Ukraine.  This selling point gave the public the opportunity to express 
themselves by voting for a president.  Kuchma’s approval rating continuously declined during 
his second term in office.  His popularity drastically declined during the Gongadze murder 
investigation.  Once he denied involvement, Kuchma lost the public’s trust.  Ultimately, this was 
the demise of Kuchma’s image, which he desperately tried to recover throughout the remainder 
of his presidency. 
 Many viewed Yushchenko as a hero who wanted to change Ukraine for the better.  They 
more fully supported him as he clearly laid out his political platform and the tasks he wanted to 
complete during a five year term in office.  Others saw him as being a God-like figure, who 
wanted to change Ukraine and immediately execute the changes he proposed. 
 The Orange Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Kuchma regime out of office.  
The Orange Revolution imminently failed in the long run as the government led by Yushchenko 
dealt with much infighting and corruption.  The transparency and democratic growth spoken of 
during the campaign had difficulty being initiated.  Additionally, promises Yushchenko made 
during the campaign were not being fulfilled in the set out timeframe.  During the campaign and 
throughout the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko was considered a charismatic leader.  This came 
about through his grassroots campaign during the summer and fall of 2004 before the election.  
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His charisma and energy while expressing his desire to change Ukraine attracted the public to 
him.  Though, this was an appealing quality for Yushchenko, it may also have been his demise. 
 Arguably, the Orange Revolution was a well-organized event as the crowds were 
controlled and expected to remain calm and not resort to violence.  The precedence also followed 
the set of rules as stated by Pora both within the tent city and on Independence Square.  All of 
this was accomplished per Yushchenko’s request and Pora’s leadership and assistance in 
recruiting people while stressing the importance of remaining non-violent at all times.  In the 
end, the peacefulness aided to keep the protests as a revolution and not turn into a coupe.  Had 
the movement escalated and a coupe broke out; arrests, bloodshed and serious military 
involvement to combat crowds would have resulted.  Additionally, as the main protest occurred 
in the capitol city, government buildings and other historical landmarks could have been 
susceptible to damage.  Had this happened and such destruction followed, an internal civil war 
could have potentially emerged.  Such escalation could possibly void the original intent of the 
movement. 
 Reviewing this case study and adding Ukraine’s Orange Revolution to the other instances 
of post-socialist urban political movements is important for others to see trends emerging in post-
socialist states.  With time, urban social movements will likely continue occurring in other states 
trying to formulate their democracy after socialism.  It appears that post-socialist urban political 
movements are part of a natural transition in political structures.  This is especially true for states 
whose democratic system is not solidly established and being upheld.  Dissidence emerges 
between citizens and government members. 
 The state’s citizens observe how the state forms, implements and enforces the new 
democratic initiatives.  When they observe consistent events and activities against or challenging 
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democracy, the public responds in due time.  Their response comes after a turning point event, 
the “last straw,” for the public and results in their reaction.  In Ukraine, this turning point was the 
2004 presidential election.  The public reacted, no longer being passive.  The state’s leadership 
will react in a way to promote the pre-defined democratic guidelines. 
 Such movements are becoming a phenomenon.  Prior to the Orange Revolution, 
movements in Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Georgia occurred.  Ukraine’s Orange Revolution 
leaders turned to the previous movements and learned from them and furthered their purpose and 
execution.  Ukraine’s post-socialist urban political movement was the first of these movements 
which heavily utilized and relied on technology – specifically the internet and cell phones to 
convey updates instantaneously. 
 Most recently, the political movement in Libya followed and even further enhanced the 
trend of using technology to communicate information.  As in Ukraine, cell phones and internet 
were used to inform citizens of updates.  In Libya, Facebook, was also used to inform citizens.  
Libya’s movement followed those in Lebanon and Kuwait.  It is highly possible to see these 
movements continue to emerge in states where the foundation of the political structure changes; 
and these transitions encounter either a delay or complete standstill in their development. 
 My new research findings show what life was like during socialism, and after 
independence as well as how the change to democracy stagnated and the effect it had on citizens, 
urging them to take a stand to reinforce democratic initiatives.  My participants clearly saw from 
their own experiences differences in the early years of independence under Kravchuk, when 
changes were being implemented; when changes were delayed, and eventually stopped under 
Kuchma.  They expressed how bureaucracy emerged and returned, delaying the acceptance of 
the changes and guidelines of a new political system.  To a certain extent, they allowed 
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bureaucracy to return to the state, as it was familiar to them and the leadership.  However, they 
also acknowledged that the transition towards democracy severely slowed, coming to a standstill.  
Their motivation to react and respond to the lag was the presidential election.  Citizens realized 
their beliefs, values and desire for the state aligned with one another.  Together, they forged the 
Orange Revolution resulting from an election laden with fraud. 
 The Orange Revolution served as a turning point for people to change a system that was 
developing and deviating from the previously set democratic process.  With the Orange 
Revolution, changes were demanded.  Yushchenko became the beacon of light to enforce 
changes.  After the Orange Revolution, people expected democracy to be implemented, practiced 
and used consistently.  Hopes were high for immediate results as previously desired changes 
took great amounts of time to matriculate or never occurred. 
 Hearing my participants’ personal testimonials and experiences gives a “view from the 
trenches” and better acknowledges the observed discourse within the state.  The oral histories 
provide a better understanding of the motivation that drove people to Maidan Nezalezhnosti.  
People did what they could to take their stance to the street, more locally in their hometown or 
neighboring city.  Understanding these motivations and emotions felt by people immediately 
affected by the activities of the governing body within the state, helps gain a better perspective 
on the movement’s potential impact.  It also shows the impact of events within the state and how 
citizens are affected and influenced.  By providing this human element, we have a better 
understanding of the reasoning, desire and motivation for not only participation, but the 
emergence of the movement. 
 Assessing these personal stories and the human element that follows, we gain a better 
understanding of post-socialist urban political movements.  Furthermore, we gain insight into 
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their role and impact within a state where structural transitions occur to a more democratic 
system.  This information helps us to better understand what happens internally within these 
states going through a growing process.  This information is beneficial to analyze future 
movements similar in nature.  It will assist in anticipating where other urban movements may 
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